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Chapter 1
THE SCOPE OF THIS THESIS
The Field of Study
There is a great deal of emotion in the literature sur-
rounding the sub j ect of motor carr Ler regulation (2)(11)(13)
(19)(29).1 This is understandable when it is kept in mind
that powe r-f'u L interests have great stakes in the outcome of
the debate. An attempt will be made in this thesis to wade
through the emotional rhetoric and examine a major area of
regulatory concern to the industry today; the impact of regu-
latory constraints on competition (16, 17-18).
Congress has long recognized the critical impact of com-
mercial transportation on both the efficient accomplishment
of governmental activities and the continued economic devel-
opment of the nation. In the 1920's and early 19JOts~ some
lawmakers became convinced that unbridled competition in the
motor transportation industry would result in the development
of discriminatory activities similar to those practiced by
railroads in the late 19th century (19, 213-215). If this
were to happen, major economic dislocations could occur in
the economy. rrhe transport needs of the government could be
jeopardized and transportation services to the public could
be sporadic and undependable.
When some motor carriers were discovered engaging in
1
c::~
2
discriminatory activities~ pro-regulators acted. The contin-
uing congressional concern about transport and the empirical
evidence of abuses by some motor carriers resulted in passage
of the NIotor Carrier Act of 1935.2 'This law eventually placed
most commercial motor carriers engaged in interstate commerce
under the regulatory supervision of the Interstate Commerce
Commission (r.e.c.). This thesis stems from scepticism con-
cerning the economic justification for the type of motor
transport regulatory system which has evolved over these past
41 years.
Overview of the Thesis
Evidence exists today which indicates that our present
motor carrier regulatory system, rather than "protect the
public interest", might actually inhibit the efficient pro-
vision of transportation services to the economy. Accepting
such a view of the regulated motor transport market as valid.
this thesis could serve as a model from which legislators
might begin to re-write our motor carrier act. It is assumed
throughout this work that such an undertaking is well overdue.
The possible use of this thesis for such a purpose is its pri-
mary justification for existence.
In order to serve as a basis for such a legislative re-
vision, the model and recommendations contained herein should
be designed to maximize the potential benefits which might
accrue to the industry and the shipping public. The philo-
sophical bias flowing throughout this work is the conviction
3that this maximization of benefits could best be realized
through increased competition among firms~ coupled with the
minimization~ through reduced regulation, of any economic
threats to the stability of the national transportation sys-
tem. Thus~ the attempt is made in the model to be presented
to provide for an increased level of industry competition
while retaining those essential elements of regulation upon
which the national transportation policy was originally based.
The approach taken in this work is one of review, de-
scription, analysis, model-building and commentary. The cur-
rent regulatory issues of concern to the motor transportation
industry are reviewed in chapter 2. The market structure is
described in chapter J, followed by an analysis of price and
output determination in chapter 4. The framework for a new
approach to price determination in this industry is developed
in chapters 5 and 6. The model presented is intended to re-
place many of the regulatory procedures in use today. Chap-
ter 7 contains comments on the relevance to the industry of
the model constructed in chapters 5 and 6, to include a dis-
cussion of its probable impact upon several of the most per-
plexing problems facing regulators today. The appendix was
added to enhance the reader' s und er-st.and.i.ng of the extent to
which present-day regulated motor transport rate structures
fail to represent rational and economically justifiable
charges for services rendered.
This thesis will not continue in the modern trend of
regulatory literature--that is~ resorting to emotionalism
and allegations aimed at removing regulation from the trans-
4POJ::'t industry (16). Nor is i.ts purpose to justify the oon-
tinued existence of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Ha-
therg the admittedly ambitious goal of this work is to pre-
sent what is felt to be a much-needed new format for regula-
tion in this field--one based upon the ideals of economic
theory, the tenets of national transportation policY9 and
the restraints of presfmt,-day mark et reali.ties. With this
goal in mind" every attempt will be made to announce assump-
tions~ identify opinionst and employ rigid economic analysis
whenever possible.
Notes
1. rI'hesereferences will give the reader a "feel" for
the near-hysterical tone of regul::tor~ and non-regulators
alike when discussing the regulat10n 1ssue.
2. 49 stat. 543~ as amended" 49 U.S.C. ~ J01. Commonly
referred to as "Fart II" of the Interstate Commerce Act.
Chapter 2
THE ISSUES
Economists and other social scientists have placed much
emphasis recently on re-examining economic regulation. No
longer is governmental supervision assumed to be the alterna-
tive to actual or potential market abuses (16). A brief re-
view of the current state of the debate surrounding the costs
and benefits of regulation is appropriate. This chapter will
form a frame of reference from which the reader can gain a
proper perspective of the relevant issues.
Pro-Regulation:
Assumptions and Policies
Regulators assume that the market for the transportation
of goods by truck has the potential~ without regulation, of
developing into an oligopolistic structure.1 The scenerio
under which this is assumed to occur runs generally along the
following lines (17, 140-143):
With free entry and exit of firms, competitive pricing.
and the freedom to make all supply decisions granted to firms,
the larger firms with their superior financial assets would
soon come to dominate the market. Able to sustain losses be-
yond the short run, they would begin to provide transport ser-
vices without covering full costs. Other established firms,
5
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unable to compete in this environment~ would leave the market.
'I'hese larger "preda.tory" firms would thereby gain major
market shares accompanied by "excesE;ive" market power. T'his
"predatory pricing" situation would natural~"y lead to all of
the classic symptoms of a highly concentrated market; rates
would be increased, services would be withdrawn from the less
profitable shipments (i.e. ~ those from small towns or those
of low-density/low-value), and a general deterioration of the
~eliability and efficiency of our transportation system would
ensue.2
It is obvious from this scenerio that the commission
places little faith in the ability of non-price competition
to prevent the development of market concentration. Quality
of service appears to have been assumed as "given". Product
(service) differentiation is obviously not considered. Price
appears to be the only competitive variable of concern to the
commission.
Regardless, industry stability--that is~ the capability
of the industry to supply a constant, reliable and adequate
amount of transport, has always been of primary concern to
the I.C.C. The regulatory result of the fear of a growth 5n
market concentration and the desire to ensure a reliable
transport supply, has been the imposition of three major reg-
ulatory policies, all of which tend to perpetuate the exist-
ing market structure.
1, Market Enj;ry is Restricted. Prior to operating as a
common carrier in interstate commerce. 3 a firm mus t receive
from the I.C.C. a "Certificate of Public Convenience and
7Necessity" (16~ 58). In order to be granted the certificate~
the prospective market entrant must submit evidence to the
I.C.C. showing that he is "... ,.fit, willing~ and able to
properly perform the service proposed •.... " and~ that the
service proposed ".•.•. is or will be required by the present
or future public convenience and necessity (16, 15).4
The compilation of such evidence can be an arduous and expen-
t:sive task (29).~
During 1.974, the commission granted certificates "in
whole or in part" to 82.1% of the cases heard (l5~ 15). Mea-
surement of the impact of this statistic is beyond the scope
of this thesis. Howeverp it is assumed that the combination
of the cost involved in certi.ficate application, the denials
of authority issued by the I.C,C. and the psychological im-
pact upon prospective common carrier owners of the very exis-
tence of certificate requirements. does indeed constitute a
very real restraint on market entry.6
This policy was established to prevent the rapid influx
of new firms which could, according to the I.e.C., contribute
to a constantly changing market structure and a great deal of
waste and inefficiency. Rapid entry by inexperienced firms
would result in the encroachment by these newcomers upon the
market of established, reliable carriers. The result of this
action could be a diminuation of the income levels of both
old and new firms, causing both to exit from the market.
This would lead to undependable transport supply and excessive
waste of capital resources. The emphasis placed upon the
maintenance of the market status quo by this policy is quite
8"..... an existing carrier generally should be accorded the
opportunity to transport all of the traffic it can handle
adequately~ economically, and efficiently within the scope of
its authority before a new competitor is introduced into the
field ..... " (15, 16). E'or this reason, certificates are
issued with authority to transport specific goods over speci-
fied routes,7 While not granting absolute monopolies~ this
policy does effectively prevent potential competitors from
encroaching upon the market of all but the most inefficient
of firms.8
This policy augments the force of the restrictions which
are placed upon entry. In additiont it serves to protect
against the growth of concentration. Before a market "preda-'
tor" could begin his potential discriminatory pricing activi-
ties, he would require access to the relevant market. This
policy places imposing obstacles in the way of such access.
J. Price Determination (Rate-lVlaking~is Subject to
I,C!_C,__bpproval and Control. 'I'he I.C.C. has repeatedly empha-
sized its concern for rate structure stability (17, 146-147)·
Leaving price determination in the hands of suppliers, sub-
ject only to demand constraintsw could initiate the market
concentration cycle described above. With this in mind, the
commission requires that carriers cover all costs on each
shipment (17, 141).9 Such costs include the variable costs
incurred in the shipment, a proportional share of total fixed
costs, and a "reasonable" margin for profit. With this con--
9centration on the compensativeness of rates~ the use of "cost-
plus" pricing in rate-making is required (this topic will be
discussed at length in chapter 1t of this thesis).
These policies and regulations arB regularly critiqued
in the literature by those who would have the industry de-
regulated, those who favor at least re-regulation to allow
more economic freedom for market participants, and those who
favor the status quo.
Anti-Regulation:
Allegations and Recommendations
The arguments against regulation of transportation cen-
tel' primarily around five major issues; 1) regulatory-induced
costs; 2) restraints of competition; J) rate effects; 4) man-
agement impact; and, 5) the effects of regulation on private
carriers (16, 16-J4).
A comprehensive discussion of any of these issues could
be handled thoroughly only on the scale of a major presenta-
tion. Such an approach is beyond the scope of this thesis,
and is unnecessary for the reader's understanding of the fo1-
lowing chapters. Therefore, some of the specific allegations
of de-regulators are stated without amplification, to provide
the reader with some idea of the content of the major recur-
. 1 . t . 1 t' 10rlng camp aln;s about motor carrler regu alan.
There have been many estimates of the costs resulting
from regulation~ some of which range into the billions of
dollars. The logic of regulating an industry with thousands
of firms is repeatedly questioned by de-regulators. Rates,
10
say I.C.C. opponents! are kept artificially high~ resulting
in a great deal of subsidization of carriers anrl cross-sub-
sidizatl·on of ~hl·pp. L> . e r8 . Incentives have allegedly been re-
moved by regulation, leaving few options for carrier manage-
ment and causing the industry to fall far short of realizing
its dynamic performance potential. The growth of private
carrictge (transportat1on of the owner's goods in his own
trucks) would probably be less rapid if regulated carriers
could supply the demand at a reasonable cost.
In a September 1~ 1976 letter to shareholders, James P.
Herring, Chairman of the Board of The Kroeger Company, cites
the following as evidence of regulation's impact on his non-
regulated trUCking operations;
.,...there are barriers to efficiency, some the result
of unnece scarv government regulations .....which add to
the cost of operation but not to the service available
or to the quality of the food ..... such as prohibitions
on backhaul whict artificially increase the cost of dis-
tribution (e.g., because of governmental regulations, a
Kroeger truck in some instances is not allowed to pick
up products at a supplier's warehouse even though trav-
eling empty directly past it on the way back to the
Kroeger warehouse) .....
Who is right? The debate shows signs of continuing ad
infinitum. De-regulators present a convincing argument,
while regulators have the law, tradition and the fear of the
de-regulated unknown on their side.
Who is Rir,ht?
1'he "National 1'ransportation Policy" provides the basis
for the I.C .C .~s mand ate to regulate. 'I'he language of the
policy might shed some much-needed light on the legislative
11
basis for the regulatory policies which we have reviewed as
issues. The policy states in part;11
It is hereby declared to je the national transportation
policy of'the Congress to provide for fair and impartial
regulation of all modes of transportation ..... to recog-
nize and preserve the inherent aavantages of each; to
promote safe, adequate, economical and efficient service
and foster sound economic conditions in transportation
services, without unjust discriminations, undue prefer-
ences or advantages~ or unfair or destructive competi-
tive practices; .•...all to the end of developing. COO1:'-
dj_nating~ and preserving a national transportation sys-
tem ..... adequate to meet the needs of the commerce of
the United states~ of the Postal Service@ and of the
national defense .....
The subjective tone of this policy must of course be in-
terpreted by regulators before the policy can be implemented.
The I.C.C. holds that in its interpretation and implementa-
tion of the policy, it has promoted private enterprise, main-
tained industry efficiency and stability, encouraged incen-
tive and, thereby. protected the public interest (14, 6)(15~
1-2). However, the commission has come under fire in the
1970's from many directions (with the notable exception of
the firms it regulates) (2)(19)(22)(29). A recent report of
the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce expressed the
opinion that the public interest is at best misinterpreted by
the I.C.C.~ and that the commission ".....remains mired in
confusion over its appropriate regulatory function ..... "(22)
(26) •
When "backed into a corner" by de-regulators 8 I.C.C.
spokesmen fall back on the claim that the United States has,
by almost any measure, the most responsive and efficient
transport system in the world (15, 1). The implicit assump-
32
tion is, of course, that this excellent system has evolved
only because of regulation. Few would argue that our motor
transportation system is not among the best in the world. If
such is the case, and transport regulation is a matter of na-
tional policy. why all the rhetoric? Shouldn~t we be satis-
fied with "the best"?
In order to ensure that the nation "gets the most" from
its transport system, the industry and the regulatory frame-
work within which it operates must be continuously and ob-
jectively evaluated using economic analysis and rational poli-
tical thought. At any given time, our approach to providing
for the transportation needs of the nation can only be assumed
to constitute the best of all existing systems, not the best
of all possj.ble systems.
There is no reason why the current "best" system should
be accepted solely on the basis of its comparative superior-
ity to other existing systems. If an economic optimum can be
defined for a national transportation system, it should be
used as the basis for comparison with our current system.
Such an economic optimum might be considered to be that sys-
tem under which all transport demanded is supplied, while all
firms are of an optimal size, and all operate at the minimum
point on their long run average cost curve.
It should not matter that such an optimum might be im-
possible to achieve. 'I'hemore important point is that any
regulatory policy revision which can move the present system
closer to that optimal position will have improved upon the
current version of "the best". 'l'heessence of the regulatory
13
debate today is essentially the disagreement over the type
and degree of regulation (or lack of regulation) which will
serve this end.
Who is right, regulator or de-regulator? That is pro-
bably the wrong question. More productive questions would
be; "Does our national transportation policy' reflect what vre
really can expect from the transport system?" If so; "Can we
improve our present regulated system in keeping with the
guidelines of the accepted policy?" 'I'o arrswer these ques-
tions, a comprehensive review of the current market structure
must first be conducted. This task is taken up in the fo1-
lowing chapter.
Notes
1. "Regulators", in the context used here, include
those in the business of regulation (those who actually im-
pose policy) and those who support its continuance. Most
~otabie among the latter group are the majority of regUla-
ted firms. Their enthusiastic support of the I.C.C. is some-
times pointed to in the literature as implicit evidence of
industry "protectionism" engaged in by the commission (26).
2. A similar pro-regulation scenerio explained to the
author by an I.C.C.-official leads to the same outcome for
the market, but the "larger firms" are replaced by giant fi-
nancial conglomerates. Capitalizing on their extensive fi-
nancial base, they price others out of the market by artii'i-
cially depressing prices.
J. A common carrier is "..... any person which holds
itself out to the general public to engage in the transporta-
tion by motor vehicle in interstate and foreign commerce of
passengers or property .....for compensation ..... " (17, 5).
4. 'I'he issuance of a certificate is decided by "the de-
gree to which a proposed service will serve a public need ...
..vvhether this need- can or will be served by existing carriers;
and, whether this need can be met by the applicant .....without
endangering or impairing the operations of exist ing carriers ..
" 49 ..'r C" C C' ?07 ( )u. o , ., ~.___ Cl.•
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5. fhe following quote from an interview contained in
an editorial in the October 9~ 1974 J:Oinc21D.J.....IJebraskaJ·ournal.
paints a somber picture for certificate applicants; "If I go
and apply for a certificate~ the first one that hits you is
the railroads. Then every trucker comes in and claims that
he can provide the service." "Fur-t.her-?, adds the .rour-naI w
"the applicant has to dig up :[)5000 to ;$6000 to pay for'-a
lawyer. It
6. The evidential requirements for obtaining a certifi-
cate can indeed be complex. During 1974~ a certificate was
denied to the Acme Cartage Company becaus e it failed to "
.. (1) indicate the volume of shipmerrts~ (2) specify the por-
tion of shipments which would be tendered to applicant~ (3)
indicate the carriers which the shippers are presently using
in these operations ~ or (1+) submit information concerning
service deficiencies by these carriers ..... " (14,40).
7. The control of basic supply decisions is therefore
ultimately retained by the commission as a result of its
fears of the development of predatory competition.
8. A competitor could petition "in the public interest"
for competing operating rights over a route belonging to an
inefficient firm, if evidence could be presented showing the
laCk of ability on the part of the existing carrier to "ade-
ql.l.atelYeconomically and efficiently handle the traffic."
9. The fact that carriers do not comply with this rule
led to the analysis to be presented in the appendix to this
thesis.
10. 'I'hefollOwing paragraph is essentially a much-abbre-
viated summary of Martha Johnson's recently published liter-
ature review (16).
11. 49 U.S.C, § 203(a)(17).
Chclpter J
rrHE MARKE'l'
The transport market is populated by a proliferation of
firms. Regulated interstate, quasi-public, non-regulated in-
tra-state, and private non-regulated firms all operate in
various modes; rail, motor vehicle, water, air and pipeline
services. This thesis concentrates on a very narrow market
sector; the transportation of general freight by motor common
carriers in interstate commerce.
rrhe Product
The product of the general freight transportation market
is the furnishing of a service; the transport of virtually
anything
8
anywhere. Common carriers of general freight are
normally grouped together in the literature and are assumed
to provide an essentially homogeneous service (J), However,
shippers demand transportation of goods in the form in which
they are produced and packaged. Twenty small shipments will
not substitute for one large shipment if it consists of an
assembled i5-ton machine. The service can be clearly differ-
entiated by shipment weight categories.
Shipments are categorized for rate-making purposes in
various ways; by weight, volume, value, density, etc. (17,
140-149). Due to the very different requirements for moving
15
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the vari ous categories of shipment s ~ common carriers of
freight actually provide several well-differentiated serVlces.
The most common shipment division in the industry is that
of weight. The standard overall weight categories for ship-
ments are; Truckload (TL) and Less-than-truckload (LTL). The
LT1 group is normally broken down into several sub-categories.
As a general rule, a small shipment will have a higher unit
cost to move a given distance than will a large shipment (17~
151). This is due to the increased handling, scheduling and
terminal expenses associated with small shipments. These
differences clearly result in the separation of shipments by
weight into differentiated services.
Even though a shipment's rate depends heavily upon other
criteria, the weight classifications provide a simple system
for differentiating services (17~ 141-142). When shipments
are addressed in this thesis, the standard weight classifica-
tions will be used in preference to other possible systems.
Two reasons exist for choosing this approach. First, stan-
dard weight categories are used in the industry for many pur-
poses. most notably for presentation to the I.C.C. of revenue-
need and rate-adjustment statistics (10)(20). Second, cate-
gorizing shipments by weight cuts across the differences in
other category characteristics (i.e., value, density, volume,
etc.), This allows for standardization among firms of the
analysis to be conducted. rI'he"type" of shipment thus becomes
less important to the analyst than shipment weight, allowing
for simplification of the analytical presentation.
Ignoring other shipment characteristics is no small sim-
17
plification. The reader should keep in mind that these ship-
ment characteristics have CJ. great deal to do wi th the cost of
moving an item, and thus with the rate charged. However, this
categorizing technique will not appreciably effect the results
of the analysis conducted in this thesis. The approach taken
in the following chapters could just as easily have used any
other categorizing system if data were available in that form.
The Buyers~ The Sellers and Industry Concentration
Anyone can ship by common carrier. The number of poten-
tial customers (buyers) using common carrier services is
essentially unlimited. The customers of primary concern to
regulators are manufacturers, towns, farms and the government.
If these are provided with adequate transportation, the busi-
ness of national economic growth can continue unfettered by
transportation constraints.
Ca.rriers (the "sellers") are categorized into "classes"
based upon their annual operating revenues. Class I includes
carriers with annual revenues in excess of 453 million. Class
II revenues fall between $3 million and $500,000 annually,
with Class III carriers earning less than $500,000. As of
June )0, 1975, there were 885 Class I, 2p670 Class II and
12,450 Class III carriers in operation (14, 120).
Regulated firms earned an estimated $22.4 billion in
operating revenues and hauled an estimated 218 billion ton-
miles in 1974. They are headquartered in alISO states and
the District of Colombia (1, 1).
This very brief overview of industry buyers and sellers
clearly indicates the competitive potential of this industry.
'llhereare obviously "many buyers and sellers", During the
research conducted~ no firm was found to control a large
enough market share to allow it to effect the market price
(rate). No mathematical measure of industry concentration
was computed. However, due to the large number of carriers
in each class and the lack of any dominant firm, the assump-
tion will be made throughout this analysis that concentration
is not currently a problem in the industry.
This well-populated market structure could be due to the
effectiveness of regulation~ or (more probably) to the very
nature of the service provided; i.e. w a lack of overwhelming
economies of scale in freight transportation. Regardless,
this clearly is not a highly concentrated industry. There
are no visible oligopolistic characteristics·pres~nt in the
current market structure.
Price Administration: Rate Bureaus
Rate bureaus are organizations which engage in collective
rate-making for their member firms. They publish rates which
remain in effect for their members until the next rate publi-
cation, or until they are dis-allowed by the I.C.C. These
rates are submitted to the I.C.C. for approval prior to taking
effect. Individual carriers have the right to publish sepa-
rate rates, even if they subscribe to the rate bureau services.
In practice ~ however, they rarely act on this option (17, 177-
179) .
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There are currently over 100 motor carrier rate bureaus
in existence (14. 120). They operate under an antitrust
exemption for price-collusion (collective rate-making) granted
under Section 5.u. of the Interstate Commerce Act (17, 178).
'I'he rationale for legalizing their activities is based upon
o~e of the requirements of the national transportation policy;
that a simple, easily understood rate system be used to en-
hance the effectiveness of the transport system and the ease
with which the public can gain price information.
By collating rate data and publishing them in a usable
form for a number of carriersw rate bureaus simplify the rate-
making and rate-publishing processes greatly. Because of this
function, they are often credited by carriers and regulators
with providing a standardized, non-discriminatory, non-prefer-
ential and economically sound rate structure (17, 179). Whe-
ther the bureaus deserve credit for such an accomplishment
depends upon oneWs opinion of the nature of the present bur-
eau-created rate structure.
There are literally endless possibilities for creating
rates and tariffs under the present rate system. Each commo-
dity type has a rate for shipment between every possible ori-
gin and destination. Rates depend upon shipment characteris-
tics such as weight, density, value, etc. The combinations
and permutations possible under this arrangement have created
an exceedingly complex rate structure. This topic will be
taken up again in the following chapter in the detailed dis-
cussion of price and output determination in this market,
Where some rate structure distortions will also be uncovered.
The Current Level of Competition
The level of competition present in the industry today
must of regulatory necEssity be prin~rily of a non-price
VcJl'iety, Hates are collectively published by rate bur eaus
for the large majority of firms. Even though rate differen-
tials do exist, the quality of service provided to shippers
appears to be the most import~nt competitive variable in the
industry. 1 Regardless, carriers attempting to engage in
active price competition (openly) would risk intervention by
the I.e.c.
Adver-t i sLng appears to playa very small role in the non-
price competition between firms. The major advertising expen-
d i 'tur-as appear to be in the "selling" of regulated trucking
to the public by common carrier supporting organizations such
as the American Trucking A3sociations, Inc.
This very brief description of the market for interstate
transport of general freight by motor truck was not meant to
be more than a cursory overview. The attempt has been made
simply to acquaint the reader with the general structure of
the market. Of primary concern to the topic of this thesis
is the method by which the industry arrives at its determina-
tion of price (rate) and output. a subject to which we now
turn in chapter 4.
Notes
1. During an interview with a private trucking manager,
the author was-assured that several rates were available from
common car-r'Lers for any transport desi r-ed . However, these rate
differentials were a direct reflection of the quality of ser-
vi.ce provided.
Chapter II-
PRICE AND OUTPUT DETERMINATION
Chapter J painted a picture of a potentially competitive
market in interstate motor transportation. There appears to
be some degree of product differentiation. This, coupled
with the large number of firms in the market, would lead the
analyst to suspect that this industry exists in a monopolis-
tically competitive market. If such is the case, the price
and output determination mechanism of the market should be
easily predictable from the theory of the firm in monopolis-
. t" t" 1tIc compe I 10n. However, as we shall see in this chapter,
no such "easy" predictions are possible.
The imposition of regulation upon this market has made
the calculation of price, output and rate-of-return a complex
yet somewhat simplistic chore for both the economist and the
manager of a common carrier. This chapter explores the na-
ture of price and output determination in this market, in an
attempt to highlight the variance between the theory (posed
by the I.C.C.) and the actual market outcome of the regula-
tory approach to market operations.
The Regulatory Theory of Price/Output Determination:
Cost-Plus Pricing
Market shares are effectively granted to firms by the
issuance of certificates of public convenience and necessity
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(operating rights). Carriers are expected in turn to serve
the shipping public indiscriminately by supplying the level
of transportation demanded in line with their capabilities
under the provisions of their operating rights (17. 14J). In
order to insure that the supply remains stable, the I.C.C.
would like to provide carriers with a financial posture which
allows theit survival in the market. Given this goal of mar-
ket stability and recognizing the overwhelming impact of the
rate structure on a carrier~s financial condition, the comm-
ission has deemed it essential that all rates be compensa-
tory.
"Cost-plus" pricing is the I.C.C.ts prescription for en-
suring that rates remain compensatory. Rates must return to
the carrier ".....cost plus a fair share of the transporta-
ticn burden and a reasonable profit ..,.," (17~ 139-141). In
order to ensure compliance with this policyp carriers are re-
quired to compute their operating expenses, add to this fig-
ure a portion of fixed costs and a "reasonable " profit margin,
and set their rates based upon the I~sultant projected reve-
nue needi. Rates are therefore determined by operating ex-
penses, which are in turn a function of demand, carrier effi-
ciency~ the price of factor inputs and the regulatory opera-
ting rules and regulations.
The formal measure of an appropriate rate is depicted in
a firmos "operating ratio" (the letter A will be used in this
thesis to signify a firm 8 s actu..§:1.operating ratio). T'his ra-
tio is calculated by dividing operating expenses (E) by oper-
• () TC"R2at i.ng revenue R.; A ;:: .c., -: ,. At any level of output, a
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carrier~s revenue (and hence its rate structure) should be
set at a level where each shipment returns variable costs~ a
proportionate share of total fixed costs, and a "fair" mea-
sure for profit. If the appropriate operating ratio is main-
tained (according to I.C.C. theory)~ carriers would earn a
rate-oi-return to investment in transportation operations
which would eliminate excess (economic) profits@ adequately
compensate for risk~ and eliminate predatory competition
(1'1,139).
The I.C.C. holds that an operating ratio of .93 will
normally produce these results (the letter Q will be used in
this thesis to signify the I.C.C.·s desired operating ratio;
D = .93 = E . R). Thus, operating revenues, and therefore
rates, are to be set at a level so that operating expenses
equal 93% of operating revenues. Using these pricing con-
straints and financial relationships~ we arrive at the for-
mula; E = AVe + x(TFC); where x = the proportionate share
of fixed costs attributed to a particular shipment. Revenue
is then computed; R ::::t U;VC + x ('liE-CD =-= ~.
Figure 1 depicts the theoretical price determination
mechanism when firms set rates based upon an operating ratio.
The price charged (rate) is reflected on the vertical axis
while output (in ton-miles hauled) is measured on the hori-
zontal axis.3
In analyzing the dynamics of such a system, we begin in
figure 1 with a firm whose operating expenses (E) at various
output levels are reflected by El, which is the hypothetical
ATe curve of this firm, less profit. As noted above, an oper-
2J
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Figure 1. Price Determination
Under I.C.C. Cost-Plus Theory
ating ratio of D :=:: .93 has been set by the I.C.C. as a gen-
eral target at which firms are instructed to aim when setting
rates. In figure 1~ ATC is derived from El by application1
With D = .93, R at any level
F.93 == 1.0753E. Rates are set
at a level which returns operating revenues to the firm which
of formula; R Eour revenue -- 15'
of output will be equal to; H :;::
exceed operating expenses by 7.53%. Al ternati vely ~ the oar-·
riel' will gain a return of just over 7¢ on each revenue dol-
1ar.
Rates~ under this pricing system~ must be set equal to
ATC at all output levels. The ATC curve thus becomes the
firm's supply curve. It represents the price which will be
charged at any level of output demanded. Demand in the
transport market is assumed to be naturally rather price-
inelastic. Products must be delivered to market or producers
will be faced with the inability to sell their goods (forced,
unintended inventory investment). 'rhis market characteristic
is depicted in figure 1 by the steep hypothetical demand
curve, D. Using curves D and sl==A'rC1, price and output are
determined in t.he normal manner. Price::: Pi and quantity ==
'I'h e shift to S2=ATC2 represents the effect on market
price and output of an autonomous rise in carrier operating
expenses (such as, for example, a negotiated wage increase).
Price will automatically rise to P2 with output falling to
Carriers are thus theoretically guaranteed a return at
whatever level of output their particular market demands. To
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demonstrate this factw note that portion of the supply = ATC
curve wh i.ch is downwar-d sloping. In this entire rang e, de-
creased output calls forth higher rates~ while increased out-
put results in lower rates. Firms can operate in t.hi s r-ange
at the resulting rates beyond the short run because of their
unique rate-making system and their essentially captive mar-
keto
customers cannot easily be competed away through price
competition. Would-be competitors must first obtain the
necessary operating rights. Carriers also cannot quickly
expand output and thus move down their AlrC curve because of
the regula~ory constraints on their market shares.
One cause of the recent growth of private carriers, a
trend which has regulators concerned, can be partly attrib-
uted to the rate-making system. This situation is depicted
in figure 2. As carrier ATC rises to ATC2, price is driven
up (a) to P2 and output falls to Q2' At some price less
than P2' we assume that a major shipper has decided that
us ing common carrLer-s no longer provides him with affordable
transportation. He therefore buys his own fleet of trucks to
haul his goods to market. This results in a demand shift (b)
to D2, causing a further rise in price to PJt with the accom-
panying reduction in output to Q),
At this point, the carrier is operating well above the
minimum point on its S = ATC curve and is charging its re-
maining customers (who, we assume, cannot afford to invest
in private transportation) a higher rate. This problem will
be discussed again in chapters 5 and 6, where solutions are
p
(Hate)
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Figure 2. cost-push Demand Shift Under
I.C.C. c~st-Plus Price Determination
27
offered to problems such as these in the rate and market
structures of this industry.
The Operating Ratio And hates-of-Return
According to the I.C.C.~s theory of price determination.
a motor carrier's level of total investment is essentially
irrelpvc:~nt' t ki g_" 1n ra ··e-ma.,_n. Rate-of-return to total capital
Lrrve s trnerrt "lS purposely ignored in judging the appropriate-
ness of a rate (17, 1)9). The rationale for de-emphasizing
return to capital is based upon the capital structure of the
industry and the nature of common carrier subsidiary activi-
ties.
InVN:;tment is normally a small portion of total costs
for common carriers. 1'he principal risk is therefore attached
to major expense items; those deriving from transportation
.,'
opera.tions. Also, carriers are often engaged in subsidiary
activities largely unrelated to their transport operations.
Income and losses from these ventures are not the concern of
the I.C.C. Rates-of-return to total capital investment are
therefore used primarily to evaluate the financial condition
of carriers, not to establish appropriate rate and tariff
structures (17. 139-140).
'1'hecommission alsO asserts that if carriers maintain
Etheir operating ratioS at or near .93 (N = .93), they will
enjoy reasonable rates-of-return on their strictly transpor-
tation-related investment (that investment included in work-
ing capital and operating property) (17, 139)·
The operating ratiO is a direct measure of the dollar
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return from rates charged for transportation. If the ~bove
I.C.C. appraisals of the rate structure relevance of the two
meaSures of rate-of-return are correct~ there should be little
correlation between the operating ra~io (A) and rate-of-return
to total capital investment (rK). 'Thelow ratio of invest-
ment to total cost, and the income distortions caused by sub-
sidiary operations will greatly wsaken any correlation between
these vari.ables. Likewise, there should be a strong correla-
tion between the operating ratio (A) and rate-of-return to
transportation investment (rT). If'this relationship is
strong, analysis of a carrier's operating ratio will reveal
much about the appropriateness and compensativeness of its
rate structure.
The relative strength of these correlations should be
tested to determine the validity of the I.C.C.'s concern (or
lack of concern) about rates-of-return. After all, the re-
turn symbolizes the economic reaSon for a carrier being in
bUsiness. It also impacts most heavily upon the ability of
the carrier to obtain future financing through investment
sources. If rates-of-return are inordinately low due to
I.C.C. misinterpretation of the impact of rates upon them~
risk will exceed return in the industry and investment will
not be forthcoming.
For purposes of testing the strength of possible corre-
lations between the operating ratiO and our two measures of
rate-of-return, relevant data for 30 common carriers of gen-
e 1 1 d
mabIe 4.1 contains the 1974 oper-
ra freight were samp e· ~ ,
ating ratios and rates-of-return for selected carriers whi.ch
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Operating Ratios and Rates-of-Return
For Selected Central States Carriers, 1974
------"_~_-C-A-H-R"W3! ~~r'~3 "--~(4-·
Motor Express Inc. 762c c c w . 102.1 49.6~. . . .1ghway .841 58.7 21 7
~xpress Freight Lines .869 29.7 1~:2
£yelOlOW
n
'Freight system .875 35.9 16 . .5
I . ns lransportation .880 26.~, 11
~-H Truck Lines .885 4).9 j~:~c:um OY~rnite Express (' .892 16.8 11·5Ar~merC1al Motor Freight Ohio) .906 42.8 4.4.ansas-Best Freight system .916 42.9 ?1 4Ch u "-' e
C
urchill Truck Lines .919 37.5 19.4
onsolidated Freight Ways .921 19·7 14.7
Anderson Motor Service .932 24.8 12.7
~ K Trucking .939 14·5 7·1
~ones Transfer .942 14.1 7.3a.zor Express .948 22.5 12·3arolina Freight Carriers .953 12.7 8.0
Commercial Mo"tor Freight (Indiana) .957 19· 2 9 '1r . 6' ..ermlnal Transport .9 1 12.0 5·6
Rooks Transfer Line .967 20.6 10.3
~lairmont Transfer Company .970 12.1 1.8
arner & Smith Motors .978 19·4 11.0
gateway Transportation .981 6.8 1·5
C
hippewa Motor Freight .985 5·7 6.4 ~o~solidatedForwarding .990 4.6 - 7·9 'I
~aJek Trucking .995 18.1 15·1
.entral Transport 1.006 - 8.6 0.4
:~estern Transporta.tion 1.013 - 9·5 - 2.9~outh Bend Freight Lin"" 1.022 -49.5 -4).7
D. N. Transport 1.041 -14.4 - 6.7
PIC-Walsh Freil!ht ~ =~ 4°. '7
TUI'A>L" (A b 22~...L__~ s ~verage~) . 22.2___~~~
lCarriers were selected to include the full range of !
Observed within the CSfJrFB group.
20perating Hatio: E 7 R.
JRate-.of-return to Of Investment in Transportation" :;::Net
Operating Income ~ (Net operating Property + Net Working
Capital): .
4Rate-of-return to capital = Net Income(Loss) + (Share-
holders equity leSs intangibles + J..Jongterm debt).Source: Ratios and rates computed by the author from
balance sheet summaries contained in; Central States Motor
Freight Bureau, Inc., Evidential submission in Su crt of
£roQosed Increa~es 111 Rat~ __and Charg~.
JO
are members of the central States Motor Freight Bureau (CSMFH)
(10) , The ope.ratl"rlgI'atl'oSraneee from '76~' 0 4. ~ ,'., {...tal. 5 .
firms 'Nere chosen non-randomly by the author to represent the
full spread of operating ratios observed among t:heCSIViPB mem-
Rate-of-Return to total capital is defined as (2J, 18)1
rK ::::; . Net Incolll,£(Lossl.._--____,--(Shareholder's Equity Le ss Intangibles ,+Long Term Debt)
Rate-of-Return to transportation investment is defined
as (23 8)..;:1. :
T _ . (Net Ol2.eratingIncome)
r ,_ {Net-Oper"ating PrOPerty + Net WorkfngCapi tal),
In attempting to uncover relationshiPs between A (the
independent variable) and ,rT or rK (dependent variables) f
least squares regression analysis was used to arrive at a
regression line of the form; Y = a + bX. Pearson"s "R" was
computed as the measure of correlation (12, 394-395).4
Very little correlation (r2=.291) was found to exist
between operating ratio and rate-of-return to total capital
investmen"t (A versus rK). 'T'hisis consistent with the I.C.C.
view t.hat transport operations and total investment are essen"-
tial1y unrelated in this industry. It may well be that the
contributions to profit generated by subsidiary carrier oper-
ations (non-transport operations) cause this phenomenon. In-
Vestigation of the actual cause if beyond the scope of this
thesis. Regardless, the use of rK as a guide to carrier rev-
enUe need determination (rate levels) must be rejected based
uPon our findings. rK appears to be a poor indicator of the
profitability of carrier transportation activities. By exten-
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sion~ it would also be misleading in revenue considerations.
fl ] t" J ] • (2 8°'"~t r-e.ia .ave __y strong corre .at i.on r;:;:::.u<:;) was found to
exist between operating ratio and ra_te-of·-return to invest-
rnent in transportation (A versus rT), indicating that approx'~
irnately 88% of a change in rT can be explained by A. A linear
regression line was obtained; rT = 4.613 -4.7(A). Since there
appears to be a strong correlation between A and rT~ analysis
of a firrn~s operating ratio can be made to shed much light
upon its profitability and the appropriateness of its rate
structure.
The I.C.C. claim for the predictive power of the opera-
ting ratio goes much farther than this modest use however.
The commission's desired operating ratio (D = .93) is said to
afford carriers a reasonable rate-of-return to transportation
investment (rT). If this is so, this desired operating ratio
could logically be used as a specific guide to revenue need
determination for common carriers. They would simply set
rates at a level which ensured that their operating expenses
(E) remained near or at 93% of revenues (A = ~), and would
thus receive a reasonable rate-of-return.
Does A = D ::::.93 result in a "reasonable" rate-oi-return?
What constitutes a reasonable return? A transport economist
who is heavily involved in this sector performed a comprehen-
sive risk analysis of the industry (24, 33). He states that
common carriers of general freight, in order to receive a
fair return in comparison with other non-regulated industries
of comparable risk, should attain an operating ratio of .926,
which should result in a rate-of-return to investment in
J2
transportation (rT) of approximately 23% before inter~.-Qt_~ and
'taxes.
A glance at the TOTALS line of table 4.1 will reveal
that these estimates ~ for our sample firms ~ are very cLos e
to 1974 reality. Substituting this rate-of-return into our
regression equation and solving for A yields; rT = 4.613
-4.7(A); .23 __Lj,.613 -4,7(A); (re-,arranging terms) A::= (4.613
- .23) -,"4.7 - .93. . 1 .ThlS resu t agrees wlth the I.C.C. de-
sired operat i.ng ratio (D ::,;;.93)·
Given the correlation discovered between A~ D and rT,
and the findings of the risk analysis referred to above,
A = D = .93 will be used throughout the remainder of this
thesis as an important variable in revenue need determina-
tion (rate-making) for common carriers.
Price and Output Determination In Practice:
Operating Expenses and Cost-push Rate Increases
• I
•I ,
We have seen that cost-plus pricing based upon an oper-
a~ing ratio of .93 is the price and output system desired by
the regulators of this industry. setting rates in line with
this system should result in compensatory rates for all ship-
ments~ a stable, fair rate-of-return for carriers, and the
protection of shippers from the market abuses most feared by
regulators. We should next ask how this theory compares with
the industry reality of today.
In practice t the majority of firms do .!J.o·~maintain
their operating ratiOS near A =:: D ::::.93. A sampling of any
of the standard statistical sources will show carriers' oper-
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at i.ng r-at i os ranging generally from ,75 to 1.20 (3), ;l'hese
deviations from the I.C.C, recommended ratio of .93 occur for
a variety of reasons.
'rhe commission does not guarantee a firm the "right" to
operate at A = D = .93. nor does it reauire firms to do so.
As we shall see, much of a firmfts operating ratio depends on
its relative efficiency. A further complication arises from
the collective nature of rates. Rate bureaus prepare stan-
dardized rates for their subscribers to follow. These cannot
be quickly adjusted to meet routine expense variations due to
the requirement for at least tacit I.C.C. approval of rate
Changes. Firms with fixed rates in the short run while their
costs vary daily will rarely operate at anyone operating ra-
tio f 1.or ong.
The current price determination mechanism of the indus-
try revolves around the element of greatest risk to a common
carrier; operating expenses. Most firms must closely monitor
expense items on a daily basis becaUse of the unstable profit
margins under which they operate.5 'rhere is little doubt
that carriers attempt to hold down operating expenses~ but in
the long run there is little incentive to do so. An escape
from cost-push pressures is available in the form of rate in-
creases.
Actively seeking the maintenance of a stable and respon-
si.ve transportation system, it would be difficult for regula-
tors to disapprove a rate increase proposal which was based
upon reliable financial records. Of course, increased expen-
ses are not difficult to justify in this day of rising prices.
They are~ in fact. the normal justification used when rate
increases are requested from the I.C.C. (10)(23)(25)(27).
Under this rate-making system~ it would be surprising
indeed if a manager's emphasis did not fallon increasing
revenues rather than on decreasing expenses (the difficult
way out of a profit squeeze). Operating expenses weigh so
heavily in the determination of rates that the goal of oper-
ational efficiency might well be subjugated to the firm's
preoccupation with seeking compensatory rate adjustments
from the I.C.C.
Added to the above operating ratio destabalizing factors
is the fact that rates, in practice~ are not actually compen-
satory. Some shipments move below cost and are subsidized by
others. This cross-subsidization factor further causes the
operating ratio to avoid pegging by the firm's rate structure.
Since this rate structure subsidization element is in direct
opposition to I.C.C. policies concerning the "required" com-
pensatory nature of all rates, it deserves further examina-
tion at this point.
Grants in the Rate Structure
The extent to which common carrier rate structures con-
tain degrees of subsidization can most effectively be dis-
covered through the use of the analytical techniques pecu-
liar to the field of "Grants Economics" (5). 'I'his approach
will allow us to define, identify and measure the economic
impact of the rate subsidies and cross-subsidies which take
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the form of economic "grants".
An economic grant is best defined as "a one-way transfer
of exchangeables~ which in an accounting sense increases the
net worth of the recipient and diminishes the net worth of
the grantor~ (5. 182). Rates paid by common carrier custo-
mers (the "shippers") which fall into this category can best
be identified by comparing actual rates charged with those
which would be charged if carriers in practice established
their rates in accordance with the regulatory ideal; cost-
plus pricing and the "desired" operating ratio.
A service (such as the provision of transport) and the
money paid for this service are both "exchangeables". Any
transport provided which does not return to the carrier the
full costs incurred in providing the service (variable costs,
a proportional share of fixed costs~ and a "fair" profit),
results by regulatory definition in a diminishing of the net
worth of the carrier (the "grantor" in this case), and an in-
crease in the net worth of the shipper (the "recipient" of
the grant). The amount of the grant is the amount of the
revenue shortfall. Likewise, if a shipper pays an amount
greater than the full cost entailed in the transport he pur-
chaces~ he becomes the "grantor" of the amount Paid in excess
of full costs to the "recipient" carrier. These types of
economic grants abound in the rate structures of common ca1'-
riel'S.
In order to determine the exact amount of any grant, we
must have a valid measure of the correct "exchange price"
(that rate devoid of all grant elements) with which to com-
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pare the actual rate charged. According to the regulatory
theory discussed in this chapter~ that price would be one
which yields revenues to the carrier which result in its op-
Eerating ratio being set at .93 (A = ~ = .93). For each ship-
ment type~ this .93 operating ratio must be in effect to
eliminate over or under-charging of snippers--that is, to
eliminate any economic grants in the rate structure.
rrable 4.2 presents the projected 19'16 operating ratios
by shipment category for 300 common carriers of general
freight. The two major shipment categories, "T'ruckload" (1'L)
and "Less-than.-Truckload" (L1'1) are included. 'I'he L'l'1 cate-
gory is also broken down into the standard industry weight
classifications used by rate bureaus in their rate-making
calculations.
Of greatest interest to us in this analysis is the
OPERATING RATIO column. The most glaring "defect" in the
statistics contained in this column is the lack of any opera-
ting ratio close to .93. The closest ratio to .93 is that
for the 1000-1999 pounds category; .941. A simple computa-
tion shows that the revenues in this category were deficient
by $'1 million. Using the I.C.C. desired revenue equation
presented previously, 6we see that with operating expense~:3of
$576.8 million, the carriers "F;hould" have received: R
576.8~~9J = $620.2 million. They actually received $613.2 mil-
lion. We can conclude@ therefore, that these carriers as a
group effected a $7 million grant to shippers using the 1000-
1999 pounds shipping category during 1976.
The category in which shippers became the heaviest gran-
Elements In Common Carrier Rate Structures
1976 Projected Operating Levels(.300Carriers)
- OPERNr II\~·-O-::::-P:::::E:=;:;'R:O:-A~.T""".I.....,·N-G-' 0 PERAT INC
REVEr~UE EXP_E=·q;..;.;\J~~;:,r:..::::.'i' _;R!.!.A£1.ILI'd:_ C!::..]
Note* Revenue and ~nse figures in $ millions •
•" Source: Operating ratios computed by the author.
~lnancial data extracted from; The Eastern Central Motor
C~rriers Association, Inc .• Statement of Eviden£e in Justi-
f.lcation of General Increase (67 carriers); Rock.y Mountain
Motor Tariff Bureau;- InC. ,gvidential Ca~e Ju~tifying In.::.
~reased Motor Carrier RateS and Char es 1n Rock.· Mountain
.territories 9 carriers: Middlewest Motor Freight Bureau,
~est:ucturing of MinimUl!!Char eS ~d L'rL Clas~ Rates Re-l3ultlng in Net Reduction 97 carr1ers ; and, Southern MotorCarriers Rate Confe:rence, Inc., Increased Motor Carrier
~ te s..,an\!..£!J11d:€&e __Er_£!1l_._J-"JPd ~~~ljtll ( 87 car-
.. ers).
Grant
SHIPMEN'll
Q.A!_EGORY
'I'r'uck Load
Less-Than-Truckload
('l'otal) :
Minimum Charge
1-·499 pounds
500-999 pounds
1000-1999 pounds
2000-1+999 pounds
5000-9999 pounds
10~000 pounds
.37
'I'ABI,E 4.2
1022.1 992.0 .971
4408.8
296.1
821. 2
4.328..3
392.0
992.1.
566.1
5'16.8
'102.2
4.36.1
_663:..2
5320.)
.982
1. 324
1.208
.997
.941
.865
567.9
613.2
811.6
532.6
~
54.30.9
.81.9
.865.
.980
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tOl'c'iwasthe 5000-9999 pounds category.
H :::;;_g_ - !±}6.1 ::: .:~46e. 9 million.
D - .93
Carriers should have
received In tact , their
actual revenues of $532.6 million gained for them a grant
from these shippers of 532.6 - 468.9 = $63.7 million.
A graphic presentation of the effects of these grants on
the theoretical price determination mechanism is pr-e sented in
figure 3. Hypothetical ATC curves for the Minimum Charge and
5000-9999 pounds categories have been plotted, along with hy-
pothetical demand curves for each. Referring first to the
minimum charge category, if the operating ratio (A) had been
kept at .93~ rate 1'1 would have prevailed with output set at
Q1, The rise in the operating ratio to 1.324 caused this
category to be grossly under-charged. Reverrues should have
been R :::~ :::)~J 0.:::$421.5 million. Actual revenues received
were (from table 4.2) $296.1. Therefore, 1'2was charged re-
sulting in a grant to these shippers of 421.5 - 296.1 = ~125.4
million. Output at the new grant-induced rate (r2) increased
to Q2' The total grant element is depicted by shaded area A.
Moving in figure 3 to the 5000-9999 pounds category,
Erates should have been set at r4 yielding revenues of R = D =
1+36. 1_
.93 468.9 millionf and output of Q4' Instead, r3 was
charged yielding revenues of $532.6 million. The grant in
this case flows to the carrier. Output is reduced from Q4 to
Q3 ~ resulting in a total grant element of 532.6 - 1..l-68.9=
$63.7 million = shaded area B.
The economic impact of these grants is obviously a mis-
allocation of resources. Some shipment categories are subsi-
dized resulting in an excessive allocation of production to
rron- Mile Rate
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Minimum Charge
A.I'C.. •- Mlnlmum Charge
r1: ,_".__
_A==.930 'V" ., ';
,,'
I
i
i,
I
I
I
I
I
A=. 81 j!1, , "_ ~ ~ ~~-:~~~~ ~~:~;C~}~:~~_:::C"::::"~:;:F:_~'_=-' '.,..,:~ _
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Figure 3. The Economic Impact
Of Rate structure Grant Elements
their market. 0 .ther categorieS are deprived of some transport
due to the esser1tl"ally dl'scr'l'ynl'nto' Y '1 1 f'_ . ' _lGi.~ r, ,~eve o. rates charged,
This topic is taken up again in much greater deta4l.. in the
appendix to this thesis. The grant elements, flows and ra-
tios are c()mpu·ted a",d 8,n~"lvzed. ~".rld t"_ u . 0 _ • 0. sugges'-~ons are put forth
for methods to rid the rate structure of these d' t .
1f3 'ortlons,
Current Problems in Price Determination:
Regulation VersUS competition
Thus far we have discussed a market whose structure
appears to have a great potential for a high level of compe-
tition. A service only differentiated to any great degree by
th.e size and composition of the shipment demanded, an unusual-
ly large number of buyers and sellers, and the existence of
literally no evidence of market concentration; all of these
market characteristicS give this industry a higher theoreti-
cal potential for competition than most other sectors of the
economy. Vve nave alsO seen how the regulatory rules, regula-'
tions and policies effectively neutralize much of the market's
competitive potential. The reasons for this policy approach
have been reviewed. Regulatory policy-makers obviously fear
the potential outcome of a free market environment.
The reader mayor may not share the I.C.C.'s economic
,
m'l C • •-.,,,-glv i ngs
market activity in this sector. RegardleSs, the intensity
of the regulatory debate has been such that only polar policy
propOsals have been given much critical evaluation. Regulate
or de-regulate seemingly have been the only options (16).
about the desirab:i.lity of allowing more free
Compounding these problems is the fact that regulatory
"tradition" and the Lac k of modern experience w ith a non-rea-teo
ulated motor transport system cause the issues to become
blurred l"n t~..e heat of the d.ebate (J.5)· D 1I! - e-regu ators are
wri tten rr a'""'o J. .::> "radicals" and regulators are accused of being
the lackeys of the industry they are charged with controlling.
Bee ause of this strained policy-making environment~ the debate
g;oes on arid Ii ttle effective change is brought about.
Effective and substantial changes in our approach to
regulating this industry are clearly required. 'I'h e radical
Variati.ons in the profitabiLity of common carriers indicates
that the I.C.C. is not succeeding in providing the sound fi-
nancial position for industry members which is desired (see
table 4.1). The exceedingly complex rate schedules do not
provide the public with the ease of access to price informa-
tion which they must have to rationally choose between car-
riers. The price distortions in the rate structure, discussed
in the grants analysis section of this chapter, do not speak
Well for the price inequities forced upon some shippers, or
the mis-investment of resources which results from such grants.
A vast improvement must be made in the price determina-
tion method employed in this industry if rates are ever to re-
flect the actual economic costs of providing transport ser-
vice
q
, th Kl'ng of basic supply decisions~ More freedom in e rna _-
must be granted to carriers if they are ever to be able to
take advantage of existing economies of scale or increases
i t'ty of transport demanded. This sounds
n the type and quar; 1 •
l
"k uJation Such is not the
. 1 e just another call for de-reg _. .
, "
~I' ,
CaSe.
The goal of this thesis is to develop a regulatory and
pricing system which allows regulation and competition to
shed their adversary relationship. If these two concepts
can be made to enhance the economic gains which each seeks
to bring about, this industry could realize its structural
competi tive po t en't.ia.I and the "public interest" could be
protected. The remainder of this thesis is dedicated to
the construction. analysis and critique of a market model
which combines the economic gains to be realized from a
greatly increased level of competitionw and the social gains
Possible from a rational regulatory approach to "protecting
the public interest".
Notes
1. Hates, in the long run, would be equal to AC~ but
would not be set at the lowest point on the-AC curve due to
the downward-sloping demand curve faced by a monopolistically
competitive firm.
2. E includes those items which vary with the volume of
traffic, such as fuel, depreciation, etc. R includes all re-
venues received directly from transPDrt operations, and ex-
cludes all subsidiary income. - -
J. A ton-mile = one ton, moved one mile.
4. Variables were selected non-randomly; a linear re-
gression curve was assumed; variances of rates-of-return were
assumed equal for every operating ratio.
S. Only J4 of the 75 firms sampled in the following two
chapters realized rT greater than .23 in 1974 (J),
6. P. 22, Supra.
Chapter 5
REGULNI'ION AND COMPEl' II'ION:
CAN THEY CO-EXIST?
One of' t' . ICC 1 t_ne primary . . . regu.a ory goals appears to be
the vir"tuP..l el~m~nat~on f ff t· tOt"~ _~ ~ ~ o. e ee -~ve compe'l 'lon from the mar-
ket for' the . . d. lnterstate transpor"G of goo s by motor common car-
riel'. Their rate supervisory policies, restrictions on market
entry~ allocation of market shares, and their emphasis on the
compensatory nature of rates; all of these serve to undermine
attempts by common carriers to engage in standard forms of
price and non-price competition. Inefficient firms do fail~
but their exit from the market can only be delayed by the
regulatory protections and the support offered to the survi-
val of such firms by these policies.
Conversely, the economic stimulus required in this in-
dustry to allow efficiency and imaginative management to
flourish is an increase in competition. If firms were allowed
to offer a better service or a lower rate to the customers of
th .lelr competitors, the inefficient firms would be forced to
quickly increase their level of efficiency or exit from the
market. At present, an aggressive firm must expend a sizea-
ble sum and experience a significant delay while fighting the
bureaucratic sturcture of the I.C,C, to obtain the necessary
operating rights or the permission to lower their rates.
Regulation can weigh he~ilY on tho shoulders of regula-
" '
I"
43
ted firms. It is not difficult to imagine hew incentives
could be dampened in a market where a manager's flexibility
is severely limited. other than routine scheduling~ person-
nel administration, maintenance management and quality con-
trol functions, the role of a manager in an overly restrictive
regulatory environment can be reduced to one of reacting to
rules rather than acting on market opportunities. This is
hardly an exciting prospect for a dynamic and imaginative
executive.
What is needed then~ is a form of competition which
w ouLd allow a carri.erp on its own initiative. to gain a 1ar-
ger market share or to price its output at a level consistent
with its capabilities to provide transport of a higher qual-
ity or at a lower cost than its competitors. Such a system
equates to direct price competition between carriers.
Marginal cost pricing, or any close variation of this
price/output determination method, has been flatly rejected
by the I.C.C. for use in the regulated transport market (17,
141-142). There is little to be gained by reviewing the ex-
tensive literature on this subject. It will simply be assumed
that marginal cost pricing is not a legal alternative to the
present cost-plus system. Having made this assumption, can
regulation and price competition co-exist? Under the model
proposed in this chapter--"Base-Return Pricing"-- they can.
Base-Return Pricing (ERP) Introduced
Bz i.ef'Ly , the base-return pride determination system is
one which places primary emphasis upon a firm's level of
efficiency relative to its competitors. Minimum revenue
(rate) levels are computed based upon an I.C.C.-mandated
minimum rate-of-return (the "base-return"). 'l'h e system rele-
gates operating expenses to the role as a limiter rather than
a direct determinant of profits.
The primary advantage of the BRP system is that in addi-
tion to offering the efficiency incentive of potentially
greater profits or market shares to a firm~ it places the
responsibility for realizing these gains squarely on the
shoulders of carrier managers. The I.C.C. can no longer be
petitioned to act as revenue source of last resort for car-
riers through routine approval of compensatory cost-pUSh rate
increases. A firm would control its own fiscal destiny under
this system.
Arguments for the adoption of BRP are presented through-
out the remainder of this work. In the following chapters,
each of the obvious (to the author) Objections to such a
method is discussed. An explanation and an analysis of the
system are presented in this chapter, with a discussion of
the competitive implications of BRP conducted in chapter 6.
The system's probable impact upon the industry is taken up in
the final chapter.
Pre-requisites to BRP APplication:
Modifying the Rules of Regulation
Major modifications to the regulatory rules applicable
to this industry are required prior to application of the BRP
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system. The Motor Carrier Act must be revised. These revi-
sions are described in this section and are referred to
throughout the remainder of this analysis.
1) All interstate carriers except those specifically
_ classified as private carriers will be regu18~ed under the
new motor carrier act. They will be required to comply with
the provisions of the BRP system.
2) Private carriers will be exempt from all route re-
strictions. Commodities hauled (to include backhaul) will be
limited to those items used by the private firm in the course
of its normal business.
J) Free market entry and exit of firms will be allowed,
subject only to certification of a prospective entrant's cap-
ability to meet and comply with existing safety requirements
and standards.
4) Rate-making will be the sole responsibility of car-
riers, subject only to the constraints on minimum rates re-
quired by ERP formulae.
5) Carrier financial records will be kept in the format
prescribed by the J.C.C. They will be subject to un-announced
audit by the commission. Reports will be submitted as required
by the I.C.C. for monitoring the BRP system.
6) Each carrier will be required to publish a "Declara-
tion of Areas Serviced" prior to beginning operations. Firms
will have unrestricted access to all routes within the areaS
they designate for their own operations. A new declaration
will be published at any time the firm wishes to modify its
scope of operations. The declaration will be in the form of
a map , C'" -,~"ervlced P:r'A~.Q Inuc~ 't~k~ t'he ~()rrrl of' t d ~:::.c.,_c.l~ ,~'J 0, c; , ,L .-" ,a S"B,n 8.1'(. geo-
metric -f'~:r.gur-e ~ such as a circle, with i ts center located at a
pri 'mary headquarters or warehouse of the carrier. Figure 4
18 a ruuch= simpl.LfLed sample of a "Designation of Ar'e as Ser-
viced" " t .. as 1', mlght appear under this system.
The reason for specifying this type of operating area is
based upon a major concern of regulators. with increased
rnarke't t''. _ _reedom, carriers might try to ignore low-volume traf-
fic areas (i.e., small towns). They may concentrate on the
more low-cost service they are capable of providing to the
high-volume metropolitan areas. If carriers were not required
to define their operating area in a standard geometric shape,
they could "gerry-mander" their opera.:tingareaS to include
only major higflways and towns ~ excluding the rural areas.
Under BRP~ firms would be required to serve all shippers in
their areas, eliminating this potential for discrimination.
This requirement to serve all area shippers also solves
the problem of "through shipments", i.e., those passing be-
Yond one carrier's service area. Once carrier "A" ships
f_"ood .'~ S Into carrier "B"! s service area,
it constitutes a de-
mand wi thin '''B'' ~s area. C9rrier "13"is therefore required to
transport the shipment at least through its area toward the
Bhipm t' . t' r,rhl'Sreq.ul'rementto handle, ..en s final destlna'lon.
through shipments on demand should aid shippers by creating
an incentive for inter-carrier cooperation in these opera-
tion ( . d ftlrther in chapter 7)·
w s this topiC is dlscusse
7) Carrier commodity restrictions will be greatly modi-
fied. Certain firms would continue to specialize. such as
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DECLARNI'ION OF AREAS SERVICED l
Common Carrier 'llrucking, Inc.
12.3J.j, .5th St., st.Louis~ Mo.
Ph. 314-76.5-4321
EXCLUDED COMMODITIES:(1) All Bulk Fuels(2) All Perishables Requiring
Refrigeration
Figure 4. Sample
Declaration .f Areas Serviced
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household goods carriers do presently. Common carriers of
general freight ~ flO'lleVer,could haul all commodities ~ sub j ect
to certl'~' t' ._, .a r r ca r.on of thelr ability to comply with existing
safetyw storage and handling requirements.
rnhL, ose items which cannot be hauled~ for whatever reason,
would be listed on the carrier' s "Designation of Ar eas Ser-
Viced". For example, a carrier may not wish to haul fuel or
Perishables which require refrigeration. They would thus
design their operating capital structure to eliminate the
capability to handle these items; fuel and refrigerator trail-
ers would not be purchased. If a commodity is not specifi-
cally excluded by the carrier on its "designation", the firm
must be prepared to haul the commodity for any shipper in its
service area.
Discussion of the mechanics of operating under this sys-
tem~ and the capability for carrier administration and I.C.C.
enforcement of applicable regulations, is delayed until chap-
ter 7~ where the skeletal plan for re-regulation of trucking
i.s presented.
, "
'r'!I,
The Base-Return Pricing Model
With the regulatory "ground rules" adopted~ we have only
to d turn (B) which will be set
Bcide upon a specific base-re
for -the' d th 1 C C· When this is accomplished,. lnustry bye· ..
the BRP f carl be computed for firms and the system can
ormulae
be implemented.
l
"n this analysis is the "fair
A reasonable return for use
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return" suggested by Dr. Silberman in his industry risk analy-
sis; B = .23 (24~ 31). Under BRP, firms will be required to
set rates at a level which will gain for them at least the
base-return (23%) to their investment in transportation (r'l')I
before taxes and interest.
The base-return formula is: RB = B(It) + E; where RB =
the operating revenue to be realized by the firm~ B = the
base-Ye tur-n to investment (23%) ~ It ::::the firm W s investment
in transportation (net working capital plus net operating
property), and E = the firm's operating expense. The base-
return operating ratio (AB) is similar to the previously
discussed operating ratio (A), except that R8 is substituted
for R in the formula: AB =: E .;.RB, Subtracting R from Hi')
(actual revenue from the base-return revenue) will yield the
total revenue change required by the firm to comply with BHP
criteria.
To demonstrate the dynamics of the system, we will ini-
tially assume that there are only two firms in the industry,
firms A and B. VJe begin in table 5. 1 with data extracts from
actual 1974 financial statistics of two of the 75 firms ana-
lyzed in this section (J). Firms A and B will be assigned
these actual data during the analysis. 1
It would appear from the data presented in table 5.1
that firm B was the more efficient of the two, in that it
received a significanily higher rate-of-return to investment
(rT). The application of BRP techniques will disprove that
assumption. It will show how profits could have been "normal-
izecl" between the firms and their combined revenues (the total
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T'ABLE 5.1
Statistic _
Financial Statistics
For Two Sample C®mmon Carriers:1 1974
. ~F~'i~r~I~n~A~__. ~Firm B
Investment In
Transportatimn (It), $ 4~108,000
Operating Expense (E): $11,650,000
Operating Revenue (R): $12,955,000
Operating Ratio (E ~ R)t .9497 .8993
Rate-of-Return to Investment
In Transportation (rT): .21 .32
lFirm A: U. S. Truck Co., Inc. 8 of Detroit, Michigan.
Firm B: Bender & Loudon Motor Freight of Ohio.
Sourcel American Trucking Associations, Inc., Finan-
,9i8.1 and O_Qerat,in_gstatistics I 1974-197:2~ Secti(Hl lA, p. 16
and p. 151.
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cost to shippers) reduced. Base-return calculations for the
tViO firms yield:
Firm A: R, - B(lt) + E = .2)()087000) + 11975000-- ,_'- D
AB - E - HB :::::11975000 :- 12685010 :::::.9515.
RB R = 12685010 - 12609000 :::::~76,010.
Firm B: liB ~ jj (It) + E :::::.23(4108000 + 1165000u
:;;: ;?12~59LI,,840.
Ar = E : R~ = 11650000 :- 1259840 = .9250.jj J_J
R_ R:;;:12594840 - 12955000 = -~)60,160.
tJ
The total r-evenue change
'76010 ...(~"J6016o) :::::-;i;284,150. Under DHP, this amount would
be temoved from the transport bill of shippers.
With the revemle change requirements computed~ these
firms would now distribute the resulting revenue changes be-
tween the categories included in their rate structures.
Since the I.C.C. does not require that individual firms re-
port financial data broken down by shipment weight category.
such data for :finns A and B vvere not available for ana l.ysis.
However, the revenu_e distribution pr-ocess :isdemonf';tratedin
the appendix to this thesis using hypothetical data. It may
be of interest to the reader to see how this is accomplished
while also attempting to reduce rate structure grant elements.
Measurement and Analysis of Operating Efficiency
VIewill assume that sample firms A and B have made the
required distribution of revenue in the manner described in
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the appendix. After application of BRP formulae! firms A and
B would be earning the same rate-of-return: rT = B = .23.
Their new operating ratios CAB) would be quite dissimilar,
however. This variance in A~ can be used as a direct measure-
D
ment of the relative efficiency of these firms. Such a mea-
sure is a basic requirement to the methodology of the BkP
system.
As a general rule under ERF, the higher the base-return
operating ratio (AB)~ the higher the level of operating
efficiency of the firm. Based upon this rule, firm A was
"more efficient" than firm B by 2.86%:
lAB _ AB I
L Firm A Firm~ =
AR~Firm B
.0286 --2. 867~.
An alternate method of expressing this relationship is
by computing the requirements for revenue in excess of expen-
ses. Return-per-revenue-dollar (rR) is calculated: rR -
(1 - AB). For firm A: rR = 1 - .9515 = .0485. For firm B:
rR = 1 - .9250 == .0750. Comparing these measures we find:
_L_Q~':'6750.0750) == -.35. Firm A can price its output so as to
receive 35% less r'eturn-per-,revenue-dollar than firm B, while
they both earn identical rates-of-return to investment (rJ:').
These approaches to the measurement of efficiency have
important implications for the relative competitive positions
of these two firms. However, bef'ore describing the BRP com-
petitive hypothesis, a major objection to the BRP approach to
the measurement of comparative efficiency should be discussed
and disposed of.
Shipment Composition and Eff5ciency Measurement
In arriving at our base-return operating ratio as the
overall measure of efficiency~ several assumptions were im-
plicitly made about the explanatory power of the aggregate
data used. The numerator of the A~ formula~ E, reflects
LJ
operating expenses incurred in shipping fL (truckload) as
well as DrL (less-than-truckload) shipments. TL shipments
generally result an a lower average unit cost than L'I'L ship-
ments (17, 151). For this reason, it is charged that aggre-
gating output into tons, miles or ton-miles can distort the
efficiency implications of aggregate cost and output data
(23, Appendix B).
Such is not the case for our efficiency measure~ AB,
However, because of the recurring nature of this topic in the
literature, the problem will not be dismissed so easily. It
will be closely examined in this section to ensure that BHP
is not credited with performing a function of which it is not
actually capable.
Simply stated, the problem arises when the composition
of a firm's output varies radically with that of another.
For example. firm A shipped primarily TL shipments while firm
B handled primarily DrL shipments. Without allowing for this
output composition variance, a measure of efficiency based
upon output and expenses would automatically assign the high-
er efficiency rating to firm A~ based upon its lower average
unit cost-par-ton.
In fact, efficiency may not impact on this comparison to
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the degree assumed. The analyst might simply be observing
the results of firm A handLi.ng primarily the Le ss-cost l.y 'I'.L
shipments, while its competitor concentrates on HJ1L shipments.
For this reason, shipment composition in a firm's output must
be controlled for when measuring carrier efficiency in terms
of output data.
The use of AB satisfies this requirement. This measure
of efficiency has built into its structure the ability to
eliminate output composition factors which cause distortions
in efficiency measurement. BRP requires that a carrier 1'e-
ceive revenue equal to at least that which would be received
if all shipment categories paid their full share of operating
costs. Therefore, even if a carrier concentrates on one ship-
ment type (TL or LTL), his return will still be effected by
the efficiency with which he moves those shipments~ not by the
weight or category of the shipment itself.
To demonstrate this point, an alternative measure of
efficiency will be computed for our two sample firms A and B.
'This "efficiency ratio" (ER) will measure their relative
efficiency levels while controlling explicitly for their re-
spective output composition mixes. Using the BRP efficiency
measure AB, firm A was determined to be more efficient than
firm B by 2.86%.2 If AB actually resolves the output compo-
sition problem, any measure of efficiency explictly allowing
for output composition should reach approximately the same
conclusion. Therefore, if these computed efficiency ratios
result in a measure (:t) 5% of that obtained using AB (2.717,,;:
to ).003%), the base-return operating ratio will be accepted
56
as a reliable measure of carrier operating efficiency. Its
competitive measurement property will then be used to analyze
the performance of firms .In their roles as competitors.
The efficiency ratio formula developed for use in this
analysis is~
It
This equation consists of the following elements:
til
.1 L'I'I,--: Cos.t-per-J_JTLton. '1'L'1-I-L(tons hauled in L'I'LEL'l'L
shipments) was extracted from one of the two primary data
sources for this section (3).
The most specific estimate found in the literature of
the cost relationship between shipping L'1'Land '1'L shipments
assigned a 2.08-to-l cost ratio between L'rL and 'I'Lcategories.
That is, LTL shipments were estimated to cost approximately
2.08 times as much per-ton to deliver as TL shipments (23,
B-50). This relationship; ACLTL = 2.08(ACTL) will be assumed
sufficiently accurate for purposes of the following analysis.
EIiI'L(total expenses incurred in transporting L'1'Lton) is
17~L'l'L=
therefore computed:
'l'hisequ.ation yields total L'1'Lexpenses for the firm by
assigning the appropriate unit cost to L'1'Ltons and applying
that rate to the portion of expenses used in DrL operations.
'I'V1'L
'T'~ '1' 01'
_ the percent of all tons which were shipped in LTL
categories.
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rp
-'TTJ
-r:;' - ;:;;: cost per=I'L ton.
_l.-.IiT:L
source as TLTL (J). ETL =
T''I'Lis extracted from the same
E - E1r1'1.w4 •
rrrpT
1i~ - the percent of all tons which were shipped in 'I'L
~ 'I'O'I'
shipments.
It :::::investment in transportation. [1'hesedata were
extracted from the second primary data source (10).
rr able 5.2 contains all data necessary to compute the
efficiency ratios for the two firms. Computations yield,
(
r (102872) .
E ,~I 2.08 h.57055 ~
L1L::: 11 97 5 ~ (10 ?.§11.)' . (6 .52n28 ,_,f·08\757055 + .757055 = 11975(.2465) = 2592.
~ .2822.. -1
11975 LT. 2827 .f:"' • 'Bbm
ETL = 11975 - 2592 :::::9J83.
\
.192827 l02_EiU) + 654_tZ.98.(76512~
___ 2592 757055 93~\757055L1
ER J087 .
- 52·Z~·125.9) + 62·7(.~64~]::: 0213_, J087 . -.'
6 r~ 1.0079~
11 50L0.0079 + . 515~J
=: 11650(.6617) :::::7709.
1
1Li-6152.(1 !.r(152) + 12.21.tZO (J2mci
7709 ,301622 jCjI}l 301022.
ER ::::-------I~108
_ a9,O(.~846) ~.4(.515!:UJ::::: 00rZ2- 4108 ._ - "
Comparing our efficiency ratios to determine the rela-
tive efficiency of these two firms we observe: EEFirm A .
~r - .0213::::: 02958 - ? 058d 'I'ha.t .~lS. fl'r'm A l"S 2.95°.L';KFirm B - .0072' - ~"/ -10., U
'l'ABLE 5,2
Financial and Operating Statistics1
Sample Firms A and B: 19?L~
-=p-:"t-a--:t-:i:-.srrc=-~-=-~ -_-----------'------F irm A
Total Tons Hauled (TTOT)z ?5?055 J01622
L'I'L'I'ons Hauled (I'DI'J-1): 102877 1.46152
TL Tons Hauled (TTL): 1554'10
Operating Expenses (El): 11975 11650
Investment in Transportation (It): J08?
1AII figures in thousands.
Source: American Trucking Associations, Inc .• Financial
and Operatin_g_St0tistics t 12Z_4-·197J, and; Central States Mo-tor Freight Bureau, Inc., Evidential Submission in S1dl2portof
Proposed Incre~ses in Rates and Charges, February 13, 1929_,
times as efficient as firm B uSlng the efficiency ratio
method.
Comparing this relationship with that found using A~ as
an efficiency measure, we find that the ER measure varies
only 3.4% from the AD measure: (!)5% = 2.717% to 3.003%.
The ER result (2.958%) is well within the range allowed prior
to cornputing ER.
Eased upon these findingsf A~ will be accepted as aD -
reliable measure of the relative efficiency of firms. 'The
output composition complaint will be dismissed as irrelevant
when drawing conclusions about carrier efficiency using the
base-return operating ratio (A?'.
-'
'To re-state our "gerie ra.l. rule", the higher the base-
return operating ratio, the higher the level of efficiency
of a firm. The competitive implications of the efficiency
measuring capability of AB are such that we can now build
our model of price competition under regulation.
Notes
1. Sample firms A and B represent. respectively, u.n,
T'ruck Company of Detroit, Michigan, and Bender and Loudon
Wotor Freight of Richfield, Ohio.
2. P. 53, Supra,
Chapter 6
BASE-RETURN PRICING:
A COMPE'I'ITIVS;HYPorI'HE:SI:S
We determined in chapter 5 that when the base-return
operating ratio (AB) is the primary measure of carrier effi-
ciency. our sample firm A out-performed firm B by a signifi-
cant margin. Several options are therefore open to a firm
such as firm Ao which has an efficiency advantage over its
rival. The competitive implications of this situation make
up the subject of this chapter.
Competitive Options
Managers of a firm with an efficiency advantage over its
rival must decide between several competitive options. with-
in the constraints imposed by base-return revenue requirements
and the magnitude of the competitive advantage, a firm can opt
to maximize growth, or profits, or some combination of both.
Alternatively, it may pursue some sub-maximizing course of
action, usually described as "satisficing" behavior. Our
concern will now be focused upon the processes through which
the pursuit of these options would impact on the market and
rate structures of the industry under BRP.
Four assumptions are basic to the analysis which follows:
1) Each firm is assumed to have equal access to all fac-
tors of production. Management talent, labor, technologically
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advanced equipment and warehousing facilities are all assumed
to be available at a non-discriminatory price to all firms.
Whether or not these inputs are efficiently combined by the
firm constitutes the primary competitive variable in the anal-
YS:LS"
2) All firms face the same long run industry average
. . 1cost curve for each sh1pment type.
3) Customers are assumed indifferent to the services of
firms. Product differentiation is possible only in terms of
the rate charged.
4) 'I'helevel of investment varies directly with the
level of output; It - (f)Q. With incr~ased output (more ton-
miles hauled), more operating property (trucks, warehouse
space, etc) must be obtained. No empirical measure was made
of this relationship due to a lack of properly formatted sta-
tistical data. A hypothetical function is assumed for the
theoretical presentation in this chapter.
These four assumptions, when combined with the base-re-
turn regulatory modifications listed in chapter 5,2 result in
a market wherein the internal efficiency of the carrier is
the determining factor in its relative competitive position
among its rivals. Given the requirement to earn a minimum
rate-of-return (the base-return), the only way in which a
firm can out-perform its competitors is by operating more
efficiently. The firm which accompLi.shes this goal to a de-
gree superior to its competitors can act on the competitive
options discussed in the following sections; maximization of
growth or profits.
Growth Maximization
If the carrier with the efficiency advantage opts to
maximize growth (i.e. ~ market share)" it must first analyze
its potential for price competition. Management must then
determine the probable impact on.the firm"s market share if
this course of action is pursued.
To demonstrate this managerial process of market analy-
sis) we will assume a market composed of two hypothetical
firms; X and Y. '['able6.1 contains the necessary financial
and operating statistics for these firms. With both carriers
initially earning rT = B = .23. firm X must charge rates de-
signed to gain at least 17.6¢ per-revenue-dollar in excess of
operating expenses (rR = 1 - .824 = .176 = 17.6¢). Firm Y
must earn rR of at least 22.2¢. Lower rates than thesewou1.d
place the firms in violation of I.C.C. minimum rate regula-
tions under BRP, by reducing their rates-of-return below the
base-return level.
Firm X has a 4.6¢ per-revenue-dollar pricing advantage
over firm Y (22.2 _. 17.6 = 4.6), By setting its rates at the
minimum level, firm X's price advantage will be realized.
Being indifferent to suppliers, customers will be gained for
firm X due to its competitive rate advantage. F'irm X will
increase its market share up to the point where the two firms'
rates reach equality. This will occur due to the increased
investment required of firm X as its output rises (It = (f)Q).
At that point, shippers will be totally indifferent to the
services of these firms due to the lack of any price differ-
ential, and X and Y will divide the remaining demand equally.
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1'ABLE 6.1
Financial and Operating Statistics
Hypothetical Firms X and Y
(Prier to Competition)
lVIK'r
H'l ABCARRIER Q SHARE D E It rR rT
Firm X 1500 50% 12750 10500 .824 9783 1?6¢ .2.3
Firm Y 1500 ~ 13500 10500 .824 lJ9.lD. 22.2¢ .21
'rO'llAI,S 3000 100% 26250 21000 .800 22826 20.0¢ .23
§our~: Hypothetical data constructed by the authl1>r.
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Figure 5 depicts this process graphically. We assume
that demand remains constant at JOOO ton-miles (we will make
no differentiation between TL or tTL tons for this example).
'I'he firms are assumed to be at a point on the :industryAC
curve where the average unit cost (less return) is constant
over the relevant range (1250 to 1750 ton-miles), The E
curve reflects AC (less return) for both carriers.
'I'he two RB=B (It)+E=S curves represent the supply curves
of firms X and Y. In this mOdified cost-plus approach, RB
(the base-return revenue) must be realized for each shipment
at all levels of output. The supply curves slope upward
reflecting the investment function; It = (f)Q. Price and
quantity combinations consistent with setting rT equal to the
base-return can be plotted from these supply curves as shown
by the dashed lines in figure 5.
There is no demand curve plotted. Demand is assumed to
remain constant at 3000 ton-miles. Since shippers are in-
different to all but price, the firm with the lowest rate
will supply all transport up to that point where another firm
can match the rate. They then will begin to split the output
equally between them.
At the point of application of ERP formulae, both firms
have equal market shares. Each supplies 1500 ton-miles. How-
ever, due to the minimum rate constraints imposed by the BRP
calculations, firm Y must charge $9.00 per-tan-mile while
firm X may charge as low as $8.50. The vertical distance
between the two firms' supply curves measures this competi-
tive pricing advantage of firm X. It reflects XIS ability
P,AC
(Rate)
8
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Figure 5~ Base-Return Pricing:
The Competitive Process (Growth Maximization)
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(through superior operating efficiency) to provide an equal
amount of transport with a lower amount of investment~ and
hence, to be able to charge a lower rate.
fable 6.2 presents the financial and operating statis-
tics for these two firms after firm X gains its full poten-
tial market share. Comparing tables 6.1 and 6.2, the impact
of this competitive process on the market share distribution
and the rate structure can be observed.
Firm X has captured 58.3% of the market. Shippers face
the same overall nrice for their transportation; HE = $26,250
for supply of 3000 ton-miles. Both firms continue to earn
the base return; r'I'== 235& before taxes and interest.
Firm Y cannot reduce its rates below a level at which
its rate-of-return equals the base-return. In order to re-
gain its market share, firm Y will have to shift its supply
curve (RB==B(It)+E=S) to the right. Since the base-return is
set at its minimum by I.C.C. policy, reduction of the revenues
required (shifting of the supply curve to the right) can only
be accomplished by reducing investment or operating expenses.
Reduction of either of': these variables wi thout a reduction in
output implies increased efficiency.
Reducing investment while maintaining output, return and
expenses at their current levels equates to Using factors of
production more intensively, i.e., getting more production
for each dollar of investment. Reducing expense~ while hold-
ing output, return and investment at their current levels re-
quires the use of factors of production more efficiently, i.e. *
producing at a lower unit cost. Either of these actions will
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TABLE 6.2
Financia.l and Operating Statistics
Hypothetical Firms X and yGrowth Maximization: After Competition --IVIKT RB ABCARRIER Q SHARE E It rR rT
Firm X 1750 58.3% 15312.50 12250 .800 l3J15 20.0¢ .23
Firm Y 1250 41.7~ 10937·50 8250 _:._§QQ _ill! ~.9..:..Qi .23
'rOTALS 3000 100.0% 26250.00 21000 .800 22826 20.0¢ .23
Source! Ta.ble 6.1 and figure 5.
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Hcause B to drop, the supply curve will shift to the right~
and firm Y will capture a competitive price advantage over
firm X.
A't that point. customers would gravitate to firm Y due
to its lower rates. The shipping public would receive the
same amount of transportation at a further reduced rate due
to Y's increased efficiency. During the entire process, both
firms X and Y will retain their rate-of-return at B, the
I.C.C. required rate.
Accepting the growth maximization option. can cause i'irms
to continuously strive to improve their efficiency. This re-
suIts in a lower transport bill for the economy and a more
efficient or intensive use of factors of production. Both of
these results are consistent with optimal economic behavior
and the national transportation policy.
Profit Maximization
If the carrier with the efficiency advantage opts to max-
imize profits (rT), management is again faced with analyzing
the firm's potential profit capabilities. To demonstrate this
process, we again start with the data assumed for hypothetical
firms X and Y in table 6.1.
Figure 6 graphically presents the profit maximization
process. Table 6.3 contains the mathematical computations
implicit in figure 6. The figure and table are ccllated by
placing the (a), (b), (c) and (d) of figure 6 under the
CARRIER column of table 6.3,
7 E 7 EI I, ,
I I
I I
I I
oL;1- r I, If500 ~L 1500Q o I Q
QX&Y QX&Y
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Figure 6, Base-Return Pricing:
The Competitive Process
(Profit Maximization)
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TABLE 6.3
Financial and Operating Statistics
Hypothetical Firms X, Y and Z
Prefit Maximization: After Competition-----MKT
Q SHARE RB E AnJj It rH. rTCARIUER
Firm X 1500 50% 12750 10500 .824 .23
Firm Y 1500 ~~ lJ500 10500 ~ 1]04) 22.2~ ~
TOTALS 3000 100% 26250 21000 .800 22826 20.0¢ .2J-------~-.~---~--~---------~--~------~-----~----~-~----------
Firm X 1500 50% 13500 10500 .778 9783 22.2¢ ·31
Firm Y 1500 .....2Q1f 13500 10500 .J..1.fi 1)04.3..22.2~ .:Ll
TOTALS 3000 100% 27000 21000 .778 22826 22.2¢ .26------------------------------~-----------------------------
Firm X 1500 50% 12750 10500 .824 9783 17.6¢ .23
1000 33% 8500 7000 .824 6521 17.6¢ .23
1000 ~ 8500 _7000 .824 6521 12.6£ .2)
Firm Y
Firm Z
~Q~~~§ ]~QQ__~l§!__~2Z~Q__~~~QQ__~§g~__~3§g§__!Z~§~--~g]
(d)l
Firm X 1332 44% 11033 9321+ .845 7430 15·5¢ .23
Firm Y 834 28% 6908 5838 .845 1.1-65215·5¢ .23
Firm Z ~ 28% 6908 5838 .:...8454652 1.5·5~ ~
'l'OTAlS 3000 100% 24849 21000 .845 16734 1.5·5¢ .23
lsections (a), (b) , (c) and (d) of this table correlateto the equivalent lettered sectiens of figure 6.Source: Table 6.1 and Figure 6.
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We begin in figure 6(a) with the market position of each
firm immediately after the application of BRP. The firms
have equal market shares. Firm X Supplies its transportation
at $8.50 per-ton-mile while firm Y ch2rges $9.00. These
rates are set at the minimum allowable level under the BRP
minimum rate restriction; both firms are earning rT = 23%.
Table 6.3(a) shows the market statistics for this situation.
In figure 6(b)~ firm X has decided to raise its rates
equal to firm Y's to capture a higher rate-of-return. The
shaded area identifies that range of rates which will yield
rT>.23 for firm X. rrable 6.3(b) shows that firm X has in-
deed raised its rate-of-return to .31 at the expense of the
shipping public. The total transport bill has risen nearly
J% from RB = $26,250 to RB = $27,000. However, firm X cannot
maintain this position beyond the short run.
Rates-of-return of regulated firms are (and would con-
tinue to be under BRP) public information. Entrepreneurs
would quickly note the economic profits accruing to firm X
(r'I'>B) . with freedom of entry, potential compet itors would
be attracted into the industry. This action would result in
a rapid deterioration of firm XWs price advantage.
To demonstrate how entry of a new firm would effect the
market, we will assume the entry of firm Z. We will also
assume that firm Z is only as efficient as our less-profitable
firm Y (At any assumed level of efficiency, the analytical
concepts would remain the same. Only the resulting statistics
would change to reflect different relative market positions
for the three firms.).
- - -- --~--~- - .. - - - _- -- ----------
72
Figure 6(c) reflects the market structure immediately
after the entry of firm Z. Referring to table 6-J(c)~ we note
that an excess supply condition has developed. 3500 ton-miles
are offered at a rate of $8.50 per-tan-mile. Only 3000 ton-
miles are demanded. Firm X has had to lower its rate to
$8.50 to retain its market share. Its excess rate-of-return
has been eliminated. The three firms must now compete for
market shares as the excess supply is contracted.
Figure 6(d) shows the long run market structure. rrable
6.3(d) shows that demand equals supply--the market is again
in equilibrium. Ma.:i or changes have occurred in the aggregate
market financial statistics, however. The total transport
bill has been reduced by 5.3% over its original amount from
RB ::::$26,250 to RB =: $24,849. Investment in transportation
has been reduced by over 26% from It = $22~826 to It = $16,734.
r11hat"extra" $6,092 has been released for investment in other
sectors of the economy.
Accepting the profit maximization option causes trans-
portation factors of production to be used more intensively
and efficiently. rrhis results in a lower transport bill for
the economy. IIrhesefindings parallel those achieved in the
growth maximization model; they are consistent with optimal
economic and regulatory results.
Alternative Competitive Options
Modifying or combining portions of the growth and profit
maximizing options, or aiming for less than maximized results~
7.3
will not change the basic analytical conce pt.e presented in
the previous two sections. The primary effect of these
actions will be to dampen the impact of the potential. market
effects of these basic competitive options. For this reason~
analysis of these alternatives will not be conducted here.
Figures 5 and 6 will provide the reader with a framework for
analysis of the potential results of this sub-maximizing be-
havior.
BRP Price Competition:
"Marginalism 'I'rirough the Back Door"
1,/ehave seen that requiring common carriers to operate
vii thin a BEP market framework could cause an improved utili-
zation of the factors of production devoted to the provision
of interstate motor transportation services. This improve-
ment in factor utilization could a.lso result in an overall
decrease in the public transport bill as carriers move closer
to the minimum point on their long run AC curves.
BRP also grants much more freedom to make basic supply
decisions to common carrier managers. The economic incen-
tives provided by this system might result in improvements in
technology and management techniques as carriers attempt to
maximize their operational efficiency.
Even though margin~l cost pricing is not explicitly em-
ployed under this SysteD~ marginal relationships would become
of greatly increased importance to imaginative managers. Car-
riers should increase output (their "service area" size) up
to that point where the margina.l revenue gained frbm servicing
the last unit of area would be equal to the marginal cost of
providing that service. Adjustments should be made in capi-
tal stock and service area as the MH = MC position is sought.
Underlying this entire system are the basic price and
output results sought under any of the marginal approaches
to price and output determination. How~ then~ does BRP 1'eal1:[
differ from the standard models of price competition contained
in the body of economic theory? It differs in two primary
ways:
1) The process by which rates (prices) are actually set
differs considerably. Carriers must supply all demand within
their service areas. Therefore, rather than the conventional
approach; setting Me :::.;;Ivr~, firms must attempt to shift MC and
MR to that level consistent with the optimal method of supply-
in~ a "given" demand. This approach requires carriers to seek
the maximum level of efficiency through minimization of all
costs incutred in their operations. This can only be accom-
plished through improved management techniq1),es(or an im-
provement in the level of technology) which would lead to a
more efficient and intensive use of all factors of production.
2) This system contains little if any potential for
leading to the market results of competition feared by regu-
lators. The requirement for all firms to earn the base-return
requires that they maintain rates no lower than that level
which covers full costs--to include variable costs, total
fixed costs, and at least the base-return to their investment.
This requirement excludes all possibility for the development
of "predatory" price competition. In summary, BRP could re-
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suIt in a very unusual economic phenomenon; the reconciliation
of regulation and price competitionl
To test the economic claims made for ERP against the
"real wo r-Ld? , the following chapter will di.scuss the proj ec-
ted impact of such a system on several current industry prO-
bLerns, all of which tend to supply much "heat" to the r'egu.La-
tory debate. This will be followed by the presentation of a
skeletal plan for implementing the BRF system within the
current regulatory administrative structure.
Notes
1. The industry AC curve for shipment types could not
be estimated in this thesis due to the non-availability of
necessary data. Firms are not required to report (and are
most reluctant to disclose) their cost data by shipment
weight. Likewise~ rate bureaus were similarly non-committal
when approached for data gathering assistance.
2. pp 45-49, Supra.
Chapter ?
ADOPTING B.RP:
HECONCILING HEGDLNl'ION l\Im cOrl/.IPEII'1'l' ION
In order for any form of price competition to be adopted
in the industry under study, it must first be capable of
aSBuaging regulators in regard to their many economic fears
of increased market freedom. It must also provide for an in-
dustry at least equal to the present one in efficiency and
responsiveness to demand. In order for the base-return
pricing approach to regulatory and prLc i.ng practices in this
industry to pass these tests, it must essentially be demon-
st rat.ed that this system is capable of reconciling the in-
herent economic conflicts between the concepts of regulation
and competition.
'l1hemost profitable approach to demonstrating the capa-
bility of BRP to pass these "testsH, it seems, would be to
concentrate on the areaS and problems of current debate in
the literature between regulators and de-regulators. Such an
analysis might provide a new perspective from which these
philosophical opponents can view the issues. If BRP 'has
something constructive to add toward solutions for these pro-
blems, itEi adopti.on might appear even more appealing to policy-
makers.
Five of the most important areas of regulatory dispute
will be discussed in this chapter; 1) predatory pricing; 2)
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market concerrtratdon r 3) industry stability; 4) the "small
shipment" problem; and p 5) the "backhaul" problem. If BRP
leads to resolution of the conflicts involved in these areas~
its adoption will be assumed. At that pointe a suggested
administrative structure for the BRP-regulated industry will
be developed, along with recommended new roles to be played
by rate bureaus and the I.C.C.
Predatory Pricing and IVJarketConcentration
The Primary I.C.C. feax of price competition in the in-
dustry was summarized earlier as:1
•....able to sustain losses beyond the short run, they
(larger firms) would begin to provide transport services
without covering full costs. e ••• "predatory" firms would
thereby gain major market shares accompanied by excessive
market power ...•.this...,.situation would naturall;y lead
to.....a general deterioration of...•.our transportation
system.
Predatory pricing would not be legally possible under
BRP. The imposition of the requirement to earn a base-return
eliminates any possibility of predatory pricing activity
occurrdmgin the regulated sector of the industry. except
through a direct violation of the law. Analysis of the base-
return revenue equation (RB :::B(It) + E) and the relationships
of the other BRP variables will reveal the constraints on
rate-making which prevent predatory pricing practices. The
key rate-making variables and their inter-relationships are
described in the following series of equations:
RB (Base Revenue) :::B(It) + E
B (Base-Return to Investment) :::(f)I.C.C. Policy (based
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upon industry risk analysis).
It (investment in transportation) ::;:: {f)Qp Ex, Pf.
E (Operating Expenses) :::: (f)Q, Ex, Pf and Rr.
Q (Output) _. (r )Denarid •
Ex ("X"-ei'ficiency) ;:;::: (f)IVlanagement.
Pf (Factor Prices) :::: (f)Supply and Demand in Factor
Markets.
Rr (Regulatory market Restrictions) :::;(f)Law.
RB represents the minimum rate level allowable under law.
Carriers must earn a return-to-transport investment of at
least B, which is set by the I.C.C. E and It are therefore
the only variables in the RB equation. In order to set rates
at a lower level (as a potential predator wculd desire), E or
It must be reduced.
A reduction in It requires either a reduction in Q~ or
Pf, or an increase in Ex. Reducing Q is equivalent to reduc-
ing market share (contracting the "area serviced"). Since the
goal of a predatory price reduction is an increase in market
share, reduction of Q would constitute irrational behavior on
the part of a would-be predator.
Pf is determined by the supply and demand for factors of
production. Since we have assumed non-discriminatory access
to these factors (all carriers confront the same market supply
curve).2 a reduction in factor prices would effect all firms
equally,granting no advantage to a price predator.
In both economic and management theory, an increase in
Ex is one of the major goals of business. A firm which can
decrease its rates due to increased efficiency is behaving
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optimally. Regardless, predatory pricing requires that firms
autonomously set rat.cs below a full cost level. An increase
in Ex results directly in a reduction of costs. The firm
would not be acting in a predatory manner by reducing its
rates in response to a new efficiency-induced lower ATC curV8.
A reduction in E requires a reduction in Q, or Pfp an
increase in Ex, or a discriminatory reduction in expenses
attributable to I.C.C. policies (Hr). Q, Pf and Ex have been
disposed of in the preceeding paragraph as possible contrib-
utors to predatory pricing. If Rr under the new Motor Car-
rier act treats all firms equally in regard to their market
capabilities and options (as the BRP system does). this var-
iable must also be rejected as a possible contributor to
predatory pricing potential.
Without this predatory option legally available to firms,
market concentration can develop only to that point where all
remaining firms have maximized their efficiency (lowered E
and It to their minimum levels consistent with the carrier's
level of output). At this point, all remaining firms would
be operating at the lowest point on the industry long run AC
curve. They would be of optimal size consistent with their
production function and their level of demand. fhis result
for the market structure should appeal to regulators. In
addition to increasing the overall efficiency of the industry,
fears of the results of price competition will have been
allayed.
The long run equilibrium market structure would most
likely consist of fewer firms. However, oligopoly develop-
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ment would not be expected. Pressured by the level of the
required base-return (B) to seek their minimum Lnvee trnerrtand
expense levels consistent with their desired market share ,
carriers would move in the long run toward the optimum size
and number for the market. 'l'hLs would come about as they
reached the minimum poi~t on the Ex-minimized AC curve. Fig-
ure 7 depicts this process.
In figure 7(a) and 7(b), the potential for reduction of
RB (i.e.p the potential for price competition) is contained
on the vertical axis, with carrier size (a) and number of
carriers (b) on the horizontal axes. A hypothetical Ex-
efficiency minimiZed average cost curve is depicted for the
industry.
In figure 7(a), point M is that point where a carrier
has minimized its It and E (i.e. ~ maximized its efficiency).
As it moves in either direction along PMC ,:.Lwayfrom M, AC
increases as its size varies from the optimum. This causes
its potential for price competition to fall relative to its
competitors. M is therefore an equilibrium point for carriers
toward which managers would attempt to move their firms.
In figure 7(b), M again represents an equilibrium point.
This time, however, it is a market concentration equilibrium.
At point M. there are the exact number of firms in the indus-
try to allow them all to operate at the minimum point on the
max i.mum efficiency AC (ACH' ) If firms leave the in-curve LXIVI •
dustry, the number of carriers will fall toward point P. De-
mand must be met by carriers according to regulatory (BRP)
law.J 'Therefore, existirlg firms must "pick up the sLac k" for
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departed firms. l'his causes them to move c:wvayfrom thEdr
optimal output (as reflected in figure 7(a) by point M)~ as
they increase either It or E due to the increased demand.
The result of this adjustment would appear directly in"
rate increases due to the minimum rate requirements imposed
by the base-return. At this point, entrepreneurs would note
their potential to under-price existing firms by operating at
M in figure 7(a). They would enter the market and compete
business away from existing firms until the industry again
stabalized at point M in figure 7(b).
If firms enter the industry when it is at M, they have
a zero probability for survival. Demand is being met by the
optimal number of firms operating at the absolute mini.mum
cost. l'he only way a new firm eouLd gain business, as i.de
from the appearance of a ~ increased demand for +ranspor t ,
would be to under-price existing firms. 'This would be Lm-
possible due to the requirement to gain the base-return. A
new firm could not earn such a return because existing firms
are already charging the absolute minimum base-return rate.
The new firm must charge the current industry rate, which
will gain for it no competitive advantage over existing firms.
'I'he new entrant will be forced to leave the market.
No measure of "M" for either the size or number of firms
was computed. However, to give the reader a highly specula-
tive estimate of the long run ERP structure, analysis of
existing firms can be conducted.
If the average "clasS I" regulated motor carrier of pro-
perty in 1974 were to be considered a reasonable estimate of
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optimal carrier size, 1,170 such carriers would remain under
figure 7(b)'s long run equilibrium.4 This number excludes
intra-state and private carriers. By almost any me aaur-e~ 11'70
Can be considered to constitute "many sellers", Adoption of
BRP does not appear to hold much potential for excessive mar-
ket concentration.
Industry Stability
The preceeding section was obviously of a highly theore-
tical nature. It is not suggested that market reality would
ever closely resemble figure 7. There are simply too many
variables in the production function of a common carrier (not
counting the highly vo Lati l.ehuman variable). Given this con-
cession to reality, the I.C.C. concern about industry stabil-
ity must be addressed.
According to the commission, allowing free market entry
(which BRP does) would ~esult in great turbulance in the in-
dustry. Firms would enter and leave rapidly. distorting the
market structure and resulting in unreliable transport supply
(16, 59). Beyond the short run, the adoption of BRP should
have the opposite effect. Market structure and supply should
both tend to stabalize.
After the publication of BRP rate schedules, competition
for market shares would naturally increase. The more effi-
cient firms would capitalize on their pricing advantages and
the less efficient would overhaul their operating procedures.
This period would probably be marked by significant shifts in
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market: shares. At the end of this initial "adjustment" period,
the industry would tend to stabalize.
"Free" market entryp as described earlier in this thesis,5
should not be interpreted as "easyu market entry. The prospec-
tive entrant would first have to recognize a need (demand) for
his services. He would then have to devise an operational
management plan which would provide transport services at a
level of efficiency at least equ.alto existing firms. Again,
it is the imposition of the required base-return which pre-
vents the market from being flooded with i.nefficient firms.
This does not mean that BRP market entry requirements
are insurmountable; quite the contrary. If the existing
transport demand is not being met in quality and quantity
by existing firms, a market entrant can supply that demand
with little effective opposition from currently operating
carriers. '1'0 demonstrate this process, the assumption of
consumer indifference to all but rate differentials will be
lifted somewhat. We will aSsume that one transport quality
variable -transit time- results in service differentiation
f h' 6or s l.ppers.
Assume, for example, an area which is served by five
carriers of equal size who are operating at the highest pos-
sible level of efficiency (and therefore, at the lowest pos-
sible rate level). In the following simple market descrip-
tion, demand is being met but the time element required to
transport the average shipment (the quality variable) is con-
strained by the maximum capabilities of the five existing
firms.
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Demand: 10~000 ton-miles.
Carriers: Five.
Supply: lCJ 000> ,p ton-miles.
Average Deliv(;ryTime: '12hours per-ton-mile.
If a market study indicates that shippers in this
desire quicker response to their shipping needse the new
carrier could enter the markett pick up some of the t f'r a f'Lo ,
and operate at a healthy profit level (at least B). A re-
vised market description might then be:
Demand: 10,000 ton-miles.
Carriers: Six.
Supply: 10,000 ton-miles.
Average Delivery '11 Lme s 60 hours per-ton-mile.
If shippers had been satisfied with the quality of ser-
vice (i.e., transit time) being provided by the five initial
firms, there would have been no possibility for the new firm
to gain a market share. Since the five firms were assumed
to have been operating at the lowest possible cost, there
would have been nothing which the new market entrant could
have offered customers to solici.ttheir business. Entry would
have been prevented by the market .
This is the result which the I.C.C. presently seeks when
it requires that certificates of public convenience and neces-
sity be obtained by a prospective carrier pr i.o.r to market en-
try. However, the value judgements of regulators and the self-
supportive testimony of existing firms, both of which currently
impact on I.C.C. market entry decisions~ would not enter into
the picture in the BRP case (1), 36-40)(28). These subjective
86
factors would give way to t.he objective decisions of the mar>
ketplace, which would rule on all market entry cases.
The Small Shipment Problem
I.C,C. policy reflects regulators' belief that, givsD
free choice over all supply decisions, carriers would ignore
sma l.L shippers and many small or otherwh-1E- "unde;3irable"
shipments. They would concentrate instead on the more low-
cost/high.-volume traffic available in metropol1 tan areas.
The result of this discrimination would be the eventual elim-
ination of the capability to market some commodities~ and the
virtual economic suffocation of small communities. These
phenomena would occur becaUse of the prohibitive costs in-
valved in these small shippers providing their own transport
(15)(19~ 16).
This scenerio could easily develop under total de-regu-
lation. However, this phenomenon would not occur under BRP.
There is simply no incentive to ignore any particular type of
shipment or shipper. BRP imposes upon the carrier the re-
quiremerrt to earn the base-return on all shipments. The car-
rier'S real incentive thus becomes the handling of small ship-
ments in a more efficient manner than his competitors. This
will allow it to either capture as much of the small shipment
market as possible, or gain the highest return possible.
Rates will alwayS be higher per-ton-mile for small ship-
t t~ n for' lar£e, simply because E is higher per-tan-milemen s dC'L '--'
for small shipments (17, 151). However, these shipments will
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not be priced out of the market due to transnort rates. 'll~d~ .. 111. 81'
BRP ~ if one firm is cl'largingthese sn ipper s an exhorbi 'tarrt
rate either to reap increased profits or because the carrier
is simply inefficient, another firm will quickly begin supply-
ing the demand at a lower ra~e. This will occur either be-
cause profl'ts grf..!ater'th~.n B are ~val'l"b]~~ 0_ - Cl.'<,.CL ..I;.-~ or because the
competitor of the current firm will realize its efficiency
advantage and attempt to capture the market. Either way" the
exhorbitant rates will continuously be pressured downward
toward their minimum level; that which would be charged under
a maximized "XU-efficiency level.
The only possibility for discrimination against a partic-
ular shipper or shipment type exists, again. in a violation
of t.he law ; either the Motor Carrier Act or the antitrust
statutes (collusion among firms to keep prices higher). Ei-
ther of these, upon a regulator's initiati ve or a shipper "s
complaint to the I.C.C., can be rectified by judicial enforce-
ment.
It is realized, however, that regulators, who see little
virtue in competitive pricing or pure competition, would not
easily take this profit and/or market share maximizing scen-
o f ·t~ Therefore •.the provision has been included in
erlO on a1 r1. -
the BRP framework to include the requirement that all carriers
serve all existing shippers in their "designated service areas".
A firm is thus legally bound to transport the goods offered
for shipment im its operating area regardless of location or
size.
It is left to the professional regulators to devise an
se
effective penalty for violation of this provision. However,
a temporary mandatory reduction of the area serviced by the
violator has appeal 3.8 an effective deterrent against this
type of economic discrimination.
The Backhaul Problem
'Ilhe"baclchaul problem" exists ~.·.S a r esu'lt f_ Cl ,_ 0 current reg·-
ulatory rules which are designed to protect the market shares
of regulated firms. Simply, it involves restrictions placed
upon carriers as to the types of commodities which they can
haul on return trips ("backhauls").
Certain commodities are restricted from backhaul over
specified routes for two primary reasons; 1) they could in-
fringe upon the market of another carrier operating over that
rout~; or, 2) they could result in the disruption of the rate
structure if backhauling carriers under-price their services
so as to cover only variable costs (14, 16-21). The backhaul
problem should cease to exist under BRP.
Backhaul competition from private (non-regulated) car-
riers has been prohibited by the ERP system. One of the re-
quirements stated in this thesis to be a pre-requisite to the
adoption of ERP was;?
... ,.Commodities hauled (to include b~ckhaul~ wi~l belimited to those items used by the prlvate flrm In the
course of its normal business .....
There are no guaranteed market shares under BRP. However~
since commodities owned by private carriers were never in the
k t f
• sportation by regulated carriers, they could
mar :e or tr-an
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not negatively effect the demand structure of the regulated
market. 8
Regulators are apprehensive that carriers could charge
rates designed to cover only variable costs of a backhaul,
thereby disrupting the rate and market structures artificially,
BRP also makes this practice prohibitive. Carriers must earn
a rate-of-return of at least B. If a carrier unde r=char'gee
on backhaul runs so as to cover only the variable costs of
the shipment~ he must raise rates on other shipments to make
up the deficiency resulting from this practice. This would
open his rate structure to increased competition from other
firms operating in the same arSa.
'rhis rate "check-and-balance" system operates in the
following manner: The formula for a single rate (r) is: r =
E~Sf1? (It) + ~ ; where Es == the operating expenses incurred in
the particular shipment. E; therefore equals the proportion
of total operating expenses chargeable to that shipment (var-
iable costs plus a proportional share of fixed costs), We
will assume the following greatly simplified operating data
for a hypothetical carrier to demonstrate the rate-ma.king
process; It = $1000, B = .23, E per-ton-mile = $1, and total
ton-miles hauled in the revenue period (the fiscal quarter) :;;::
10~000. We will also assume that the firm is perfectly effi-
c i.errt .
The firm contracts for a 100 ton-mile trip (say, 4 tons
f 25 'J ) It charges on the first half of the trip the_or m:l _es .
full rate of; r ~ .~g~[23(1000) + 1000~ = $102.JO. On the
t t
· (the backhaul), it charges only for variable ex-re urn r1p .
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penses. This reduced backhaul rate is; r = $l(ton-miles) =
1(100) = $100. The firm has earned a total of $102.JO + $100
- $202.JO on the entire run.
At the end of the revenue period the carri.er must have
earned at least its base-return to investment. 1110 do tha't,
it must have earned revenues equal to at least RB•. 2',S'which
computed; RB = B(lt) + ~ 2?(1000) 000. . = . J + 1 0 = $10~2JO, Op-
erating at the reduced backhaul rate, the carrier would only
earn revenues equal to its reduced-rate earrri.ngsper-ton-mile
times the total ton-miles, which is; R = 2~~bJO(10000) =
(R - E) = (10115 - 10000)
It 1000$10,115. Its rate-of-return equals;
= .115. The carrier did not earn a rate-oi-return at least
equal to B (.2)) and is therefore in violation of the Motor
Carrier Act.
To correct this deficiency, the firm must raise its
rates above its current level to regain its required rT. Upon
raising its rates, its competitors automatically gain a price
competition advantage over it; a situation a carrier manager
would presumably avoid. BRP thus appears to solve the backhaul
problem.
Implementing BRP;
Regulatory Procedures and Requirements
Having seen that BRP can go far t.owar-d ensuring compli-
ance with the spirit of the basic requirements of the national
transportation policy while simultaneously encouraging the
a more efficient industry, we will now assumedevelopment of
that the I.C.C. haS decided to adopt the system for use in
91
this transportation sector. After the initial BRP calcula-
tions have been completed~ rates have been published by firms
and declarations of areas serviced have been filed~ a stan-
dard administrative system would be required to ensure the
continued successful operation of BHP. Drafting the legal
basis of the administrative framework: is rightfully the busi-
ness of I.C.C. commissioners and industry participants. irhe
following suggestions are submitted for consideration by reg-
ulators as they approach this taskl
Rate Schedules: All rates should be filed with the
I.C.C. and made available to the public on demand. Rates
should be revised quarterly. The requirement to earn at
R dleast "B should be the overriding consideration in these a -
justments. 'I'hefollowing are samples of other factors which.
as a minimum, should be taken into consideration by firms
when computing their quarterly rate revisions:
1) The level of demand during the relevant quarters for
the preceeding two years (a seasonal factor);
2) General economic trends in the economy;
J) I.C.C. demand projections;
4) Planned investment or dis-investment;
5) Unusual cost predictions (such as an upcoming 'ream-
ster's wage hike or a predicted fuel price increase);
6) Specific shipment category cost changes; and,
7) Revenue deficiencies or surpluses in relation to B
remaining from past quarters.
When these data are inserted into a firm's production
function, revenues (and therefore rates) can be computed by
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mathematical computations that are clearly computer-applica-
ble. It is recognized that rates will vary with the accuracy
of future estimates. fhis is the precise reason for requir-
ing quarterly ad justments. Changes can be brought into line
with actual costs and realized demand before a firm's profit
level is greatly distorted.
Areas Serviced: Changes to areas serviced should be
filed only with quarterly rate revisions. More frequent
changes would introduce confusion into the market and rate
st.r'uctur-e s . These revisions should be made available to the
public upon request, and should be filed with all I.C.C.
field offices in the carrier's operating area. Shippers
could thereby obtain information quickly and inexpensively
on avail~ble services.
Reports; Full disclosure of operating and financial
statistics should be accomplished quarterly by all carriers.
In order to evaluate carrier operations effectivelyp the
I.C.C. should require at least the following information:
1) All aggregate financial and operating data, similar
to that published by the American 'Trucking Associations, Inc.
in its financial and operating statistics periodical (3); and,
2) Financial and operating data, broken down by stan-
dard weight category (for rate structure grants analysis).
There would no doubt be other financial and operational
administrative requirements resulting from the adoption of
BHP which have not been included in this section.rhe admin-
istrative burden which could result from these requirements
would be counter-productive if carriers were required to
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spend an inordinate amount of their time and financial assets
on these tasks. For this reason, it is recommended that firms
depend for much of their ERP administrative support on the
cur-rerrt industry rate-makers; the motor ca.rrier rate bureaus.
BRP Administration:
A New Challenge for Rate Bureaus
Many complex and time-consuming activities would be re-
quired of car-ri ere under the BRr sys t.em. Many firms might
not be equipped with the expertise to conduct the operational
and finclficial analyses necessary for compliance with I.C.C.
reporting requirements and BRP rate-making constraints. Mo-
tor carrier rate bureaus are ideally suited to fill this
management gaP for carriers.
Most of the data analysis required under BRP would be
highly adaptable to computer applications. Rate bureaus
currently have data processing capabilities which they use
extensively in the rate change justifications which they pre-
pare for submission to the I.C.C. for member firms (10)(20)
(23) (25) (28) . Working w ith carriers, they could increase the
effectiveness of the industry by performing many necessary
management-enhancing functions in the areaS of stati.stical
manipulation and report preparation.
For example, the rate-making!rate-adjusting process could
be accomplished in a manner not unlike the following' Carriers
would first submit necessary financial and operating statistics
to the rate bureau, to include any unique operational plans,
cost pr-edi.ct Lons or mariagernerrtdecisions which would directly
impact upon the level of rates. The bureaus would develop a
rate-making computer program based upon the base-return reve-
Rnue requirement ( B "'"B (It) + E) and the elements of the firm n s
cost and production functions.
'l'Ii th 'theproper program, rate bureaus could provide car-
riel'swith a comprehensive rate schedule based upon minimum
allowable rates. After the carrier's management analyzed the
minimum rate schedule, a decision could be made as to what
percentage (if any) the firm wished to exceed its minimum
return. If, for example, the carrier knows it has a 10%
pricing advantage over its competitors due to superior effi-
ciency, it may w ish to set rates slightly above its minimum
level so as to gain a return greater than B, while maintain-
ing (or increasing slightly) its market share. This decision
would be given to the rate bureau, which would then prepare;
1) The actual rate schedule of the carrier for the
coming revenue period;
2) Proforma aggregate financial summaries for submission
to the I.C.C.; and,
J) Aggregate operational and financial summaries of past
operations by shipment category for submission to the I.C.C.
The carrier would file these items with the commission,
distribute its new rate schedule as necessary, and continue
operations.
The bureaus could perform other functions which would be
of great value to carriers, such as;
1) Preparing market studies;
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2) Advising on the potential for profit from various
areas;
J) Providing investment advice, to include surveys of
factor markets and their relative prices;
Lf) Publishing average cost data for shipment types from
the data in its computer memories;
5) Aiding in the establishment of "through-service" op-
erations.9 Advising all firms on the most practical and
jointly profitable points for inter-area shipment transfers;
and,
6) Providing other research and analysis projects upon
request of member firms.
Rate bureaus could "make the system go"!
BRP Management:
A Revised Role for the I.C.C.
With the adoption of BRP, the role of the I.C.C. as
regulator of the motor transportation industry would change
radically. It is left to the professional regulators to
define their specific activities under this system. Some
functions which might be performed by the commission in its
new role include:
1) Periodic risk analysis of the industry to permit
timely revision of the required base-return when risk factors
. t t 1.0justify such adJus men s;
2) Periodic surprise examinations of carrier financial
records to ensure compliance with BRP minimum rate regulations;
J) Periodic shipper surveys to search out potential vio-
lations of regulations committed against u.ninformedand unwary
shippers;
4) Periodic publishing of industry statistics, to in-
clude basic financial data;
5) Period ie demand projections based upon carrier and
shipper surveys; and,
6) Enforcement of all violations of the act.
ERP: "The Bottom Line"
The BRP system has been outlined and its implementation
and administration have been discussed. What then is the
economic summation of the application of this approach'? 'IIhis
system, when fully implemented, would theoretically bring
about, in the long run, the following economic results:
1) Price would be set at the minimum point on the in-
dustry long run ATe curve;
2) An optimal and stable rate structure would prevail;
3) All firms would receive exactly that rate-of-return
necessary to attract sufficient capital investment;11
4) Demand would equal supply for all shipment types;
5) Grants would not exist; subsidies and cross-subsi-
dies would be eliminated;
6) Industry composition would be optimal; no excessive
market concentration or saturation would exist; and,
7) "XU-efficiency would be maximized; all factors of
production would be combined in their optimal mix and would
be used as intensively as possible.
9'7
The degree to which any of these claimed potential re-
sults of BRP application are realized in practice depends
upon the human capabilities of management. However, the
degree to which these objectives are realized is less impor-
tant than the direction in which they would point the indus-
try.
A key objective of the U. S. economy in the future must
be the economical use of resources in the production of
essential, quality products;
.....The essential measure of the success of the economy
is not production and consumption at all, but the nature,
extent, quality and complexity of the total capital stock
.....any .....change which results in the maintenance of
a given total stock with a lessened throughput.....is
clearly a gain .....(4, 315).
Transport is one of the most essential outputs of the
economy in that it is not normally an end in itself, but can
be thought of as an input to the production of almost all
other goods. "Minimizing the throughput" involved in the
production of transportation thus qualifies as a high priority
goal for the economy.
Baae=r-etur-n pricing has inherent in its structure the
faculty of functioning as a "throughput minimization mechanism".
By causing the capital stock devot.edto transportation to be
minimized, and by causing that minimum to be employed as in-
tensively as possible, this system reduces the economic waste
associated w i,th the transport sector of our GNP/growth-oriented
economy. with such an improved level of efficiency, the regu-
lated motor transport industry could set the example of how
to provide a quality product with the minimum use of our lim-
ited natural resources anrlcapital stock.
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Notes
1- pp 5-6, supra.
2. p 61, supra.
3. 'r- L~7, supra.1"'1
4. 794 class I carriers earned 67.86% of revenues
earned by all regulated inter-city motor carriers of property
in 1974 (14, 125).
5. P. 46, supra.
6. 'l'his"quality variable" oou l.d have been any of a
number of services which could be provided in a more or less
attractive manner by carriers as part of their operations.
7. P. 46, supra.
8. Regulators should be careful to strictly define a
"private carrier" when addressing this problem. One could
imagine a giant conglomerate or holding company classifying
itself as a private carrier for all of its subsidiaries.
Whether or not to allow this practice would depend upon the
commission's interpretation of the potential deleterious
effects this would have on the regulated transport market.
9. P. 47, supra.
10. Changes in B should be made gradually and caut.ious l.y.
'rhe pow er'f'u.I effects of a change in B parallel closely those
of the reserve requirement in the banking industry. Rapid,
large changes could creat~ havoc as firms radically adjust
rates in an attempt to meet the revenue requirements imposed
by the new minimum rate-of-return.
11. As the industry stabalizes, risk would most likely
be reduced for investors. This should result in a long run
reduction in B and therefore a reduction in the transport bill
of the economy.
APPENDIX: RA'l'E srrRUCrrURE
GRAN'I'S ANAIJYSIS AND RSDUCTION
In Chapter 4, the existence of economic "grants" in the
rate structures of common carriers was discussed briefly,l
The economic impact of these grants on the industry evidences
itself primarily in the mis-allocation of resources from
grantor to grantee shippers and carriers.
This appendix will provide the reader with a more thor-
ough measurement of these grant-induced economic distortions,
and will develop a model for use in eliminating (or at least
reducing) their size and their impact upon current and BHP
rate structures. The analysis will be couched in the analy-
tical framework of "Grants Economics". The reader is referred
to the work cited in the references for a rather thorough in-
troductory presentation of this field (5).
Identifying Grant Flows in the Rate structure
I.C.C. policy requires that rates not be discriminatory
or preferential. In order to implement this policy, the com-
mission directs that each shipment "pay its own way". That
is, carriers must recover the full economic costs of each
shipment transported (17, 140-143). If this criterion is
violated and transportation continues to be supplied, there
must, by regulatory definition (and of mathematical necessity),
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be a grant from one party to another.
If specific categories of shipments are paying more than
the full cost entailed in their transport, the shippers using
these categories are effecting grants to the carrier who is
"overcharging" them. If there are other shipment categories
which are not charged for the full cost of service provided,
the carrier is then effecting a grant to shippers who use
th . r· r< by "under char'g.ing" them.ese ca-cego.1.e,::> o. It is also possible
that overcharged shippers are subsidizing the shipments of
those undercharged customers. In this case, shippers are
effecting grants between themselves wh'ich pass through the
carrier's rate structure. In this situation, the carrier
would realize no net grant equivalent.
Table A.l summarizes the types of grant flows described
above. The last column in the table indicates the direction
in which a carrier's operating ratio would move as a result of
these grants. Recalling the formula for the operating ratio~
A :::~, it is apparent that when R increases due to overcharg-
ing a customer (setting the rate above a full cost level),
the operating ratio would be lower (-) than if the full cost
rate had been charged. Likewise, recovering less than full
costs through a lowered rate causes a decrease in R and a
corresponding rise (+) in A. If two shippers offset the grants
to a carrier by being , respectively, over and under-chargedan
equal amount, R will remain stable at the full cost level for
the carrier and its operating ratio will not be effected.
The operating ratio can also be used in the measurement
of the magnitude of grant flows. A = .93 is the specific
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rrABLE Atl
The Grant FIGW
Through the Rate Structure
Direction Of
Grant-Flow
Over
Cha.rge
Under
Cha.rge
Effect On
Carrier~ s
012era.tingRatio
Grant
'I'oCarrier: x (- )
Grant
From Carrier: x (+ )
Grant
Between Shippers: X x No Effect
S0urce: Table constructed by the author to illustrate
grant-flows as analyzed in this section.
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operating ratio at which firms are encouraged by the I,C.C.
to aim when setting rates (A :::::D ::;.93). Deviations from this
target ratio can be made to provide measurements of the extent
to which a rate structure results in grant equivalents (subsi-
dies, or under and overcharges) to shippers and carriers.
Firms are faced with a certain amount of operating ex-
pense which is associated with the given level of demand.
Since, in compliance w lth their operating rights carriers
must supply all transport demanded in their markets, E is
essentially fixed by the level of demand. If carriers were
r-equired to maintain their operating ratios at A == D == .93,
operating revenue (R) would be constrained to a level equal
to ~J = 1.0753E. If we adopt this revenue constraint im-, /
posed upon carriers by the us~ of D as an operating ratio, we
can measure grant equivalents by noting actual deviations
from operating revenues which would be realized at A := D.
',Vi th E assumed given, if A> D, R must be below the level
which would be received at A == D. This stiuation is equiva-
lent to undercharging shippers for services rendered, or, of
effecting a grant to them in the amount of the revenue defi-
ciency. '/<lithA<D, R is above its desired level and, by the
same process, the grant will flow to the carrier. This type
of grant, flowing from or to a carrier, will be identified in
this appendix as the "carrier grant equivalent" (Gc).
'I'he se revenue deficiencies and excesses are justifiably
labelled grants, because the revenue gai.nedwhen a carrier
operates at A = D results in a fair return for the carrier.
Also, it results in the shippi.ng public paying "its fair share"
APPENDIX 103
of trw transport burden. rrheseare two of the primary goals
of the I.C.C. regulatory policies. With A I D. the net worth
of the grantor will fall and that of the grantee will rise by
an equivalent amount.
In this analysis, shipments have been categorized by
weight. If operating ratios are computed for the different
weight categories, grants flowing from or to customers using
these different shipment categories can be measured by opera-
ting ratio analysis. If the rate charged to a particular
shipment category results in A>D, shippers in that category
are receiving grants from the carrier by being charged less
than full cost rates. With A-<::D for a category, shippers
wou Ld pay excessive rates , resulting in grants flowing to the
carrier from customers using that ca't.egor-y,
From these data, the total grant equivalent present in
the rate structure of the firm (Gt) can be calculated. To
compute Gt, all grant equivalents for each shipment category
are first identified in the manner described above. They con-
sist of revenues above or below those which would have been
received by carriers if each shipment category was charged
rates yielding the A ::: D operating ratio of .93, rI'hetotal
grant equivalent is equal to the sum of the absolute values
nof these individual grant equivalents; Gt = L IG Ig=l g'
To complicate the analysis further, the individual ship-
ment grant equivalents described above could also cancel each
other on the carrier's balance sheet. 'l'hatis, the carrier's
overall operating ratio could equal .93 even if none of the
individual categories were yielding that ratio for the firm.
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This would occur when total overcharges to some shippers
equaled total undercharges to others. Some shippers would
be providing cross-subsidies to others, wh iLo the operating
ratio of the firm remained at n
The Mathematical Grants Analysis Model
If a carrier operates beLow D (operating ratio <.93),
it is earning excess revenues and is therefore receiving a
grant from the shipping public (its operating expenses are
less than 93;;; of its operating revenues i therefore, revenue
exceeds I.C.C. recommended levels). Likewise, if the carrier
operates above D, its revenues are deficient and it is effect-
ing a grant to the shipping public. 'Is.bleA.2 depicts the
format of the model to be used in this appendix for measur-
ing these grants. Column descriptions for table A.2 are in-
clUded below the table. The method of completing the table
f'o Ll.ows :
1) Extract Rand E from data supplied by firms or rate
bureaus. 'I'hedata in table A..2 are hypothetical, consturcted
by the author.
2) Compute A: A = E ~ R.
3) D is given. It always equals .93 under current reg-
ulatory policy.
lj,) Compute Rd ("desired" revenue): Rd ~ E .;.D. E is
divided by D to determine the desired revenue level which will
adequately compensate the carrier for meeting its demand.
5) Compute G (the grant equivalent): G = Rd - R. For
APPENDIX
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'I'ABLEA.2
Grants Analysis of Common Carrier Rate Structures
(Hypothetical Data)
lv]otorCarrier Rate Bureau Aggregates 1
SHIPMEtn REA D PL_ __ CL
Minimum Charge 500 625 1. 250 .93 672 172
1=499 pounds lOOO 1150 l.150 .93 1237 237
500-999 pounds 1000 1000 1,000 .93 1075 75
1000~1999 pounds 1500 1425 .950 .93 1532 32
2000--4999 pounds 1500 1.250 .833 .93 1344 -156
5000-9999 pounds 1000 800 .800 .93 860 -lLW
>10,000 pounds 500 350 .700 .93 377 ~123
Truckload 3000 2700 .900 ~ 2903 =-21,
TOTALS 10000 9300 .930 .93 10000 0
Rd and G in $ millions.
Column Descriptions:
SHIPlVIENT: Standard Shipment VJeight Categories.
R: Operating Revenue.
E = Opera_ting Expense.
A: Actual Operating Ratio (A = E 7 R).
D: I.C.C. Desired Operating Ratio (D = .93).
Rd: Revenue which would be received if A = D;
(Rd==E-;D).
G: Grant Equivalent. A positive number indi-
cates a grant to shippers in the weight category, A nega-
tive number denotes a grant from shippers. On the TOTALS
line, a positive number indicates a gran-t ill.m carriers and
a negative number denotes a grant to carriers: G = (Rd - R).
Source: Data were constructedand data manipulations
performed by the author for illustrative purposes in iden-
tifying and measuring grants contained in the regulated
common carrier rate structures.
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each shirment category" G tells us the total erant equivalent
involved in the r evenuo level for that shipment. For "mi.ni.num
charge" in table A.2, revenue fell ~~172 million short of what
it would have been (Ed) with a ,93 operating ratio for that
category. Therefore~ in the minimum charge category, carriers
included in the table effected a grant of ~172 million to ship-
pers using that category. A $156 mi1lion grant was paid by
those whose shipments fell in the category of 2000-4999 pounds.
If shippers assume, as they should be able to, that
I.C.C, rate regulations result in just rates, few of them
would question assigned rate structures. Therefore, these
types of grants are assumed to be essentially implicit in na-
ture. Shippers are probably not fully aware that their rates
are economically "unjustifiable II.
'rhat portion of the total grant equivalent which flows
between carriers and the shipping public (Gc) is more explicit
in nature. Carriers would recognize thi.sgrant by simply view-
ing their balance sheets. Whenever 8. firm is operating with
A 'I D, its total revenue is at a level other than where it
"should be", Returning to table A.2, the IrO/I'ALS line indi-
c a't e s that, for these hypothetical firms, A ::::: D ~- .93. Jrhere-
fore, there should be no ca.rrier grant equivalent (Gc) pre-
sent. 'l'hisfact is affirmed by the 0 appearing on the 'rOrr'AIJS
line in the G column.
Gc is computed by summing the individual entries in the
nG column of the table (Gc = ~lG). It measures the
g= g
applied revenues between the carrier and the public.
mis-
The hy-
pathetical data in table A.2 were purposely constructed so as
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to ret'Lect a zero Gc. 'I'h i 11 th "~.18 a ows e reaQer to observe the
grants "flowing through" the cclrrier!s rate structure, OnE)
s h.i.pper- 9 S gain is another's 10P)s,wh iI.ethe carrier oper-at i.ng
ratio is on target at .93. This is a clear picture of the
2cross-::;ubsidizationwhich occurs in.the market. In the reed.
wcrld
y
a zero Gc would clearly be the exception. Operating
ratios vary considerably between firms.3
'l'ctalgrants (Gt) betvveen all shippers in the various
weight categories can be identified in table A.2 by summing
the absolute values of each shipment category grant equiva-
lent. rrhistotal will measure all mis-applied revenue in
the
n
sector; (Gt :::::: E: Ic I) E'orthese hypothetical firms, Gt ::::::g=l Xg •
172 + 237 + 75 + 32 + 156 + 140 + 12J + 97 = $10J2 million.
A determination should also be made as to the percentage
wh.ich Gt is of the tots.,ltransport bill. 1'his"grant ratio"
will tell us the proportion of total operating revenues mis-
applied via the observed grant mechanism. 'The total transport
bill equals that amount paid by shippers for transport services.
'That amount is R, the operating revenues of firms. Gr is
therefore the total grant equivalent divided by operating 1'e-
For our hypothetical group of firms invenues; Gr == Gt .;R.
table A.2, Gr ::::::10)2 • 10000 = .10J2 = 10.J2% of the transport•
bill is in the form of grant equivalents which have been traced
to the rate structure.
common Carrier Rate structure Grants: 1976
h gh A 6 Present grants analyses of aggre'Tables A.) t rou' . ,-') -
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'rABLE A.:3
Grants Analysis of Common Carrier Rate structures1
Eastern Central Motor Carriers Association (ECMCA)
1976 Data: Projected by ECMCA
From 1975 Through 14 February 1976 Operating Levels
SHIPlVlEwr REA D Rd _Q_
Minimum Charge 107.6 142.2 1.322 .93 152.9 45.3
1-499 Ibs. 182.3 203.8 1.118 .93 219.1 36.8
500-999 lbs. 150.3 150.5 1.001 .93 161.8 11·5
1000-1999 lbs. 158.5 153.5 .968 .93 165·1 6.6
2000-4999 lbs. 214.6 193.1 .900 .93 207.6 - 7.0
5000-·9999Lbs, 141.1 123.5 .875 .93 132.8 - 8.3
>10~000 lbs. 59.3 52.3 .882 .93 56.2 - 3.1
frruckload 426 . .5. _46).2
T0'1'A.13 1490.2 1482.1 .995 .93 1593.6 103.4
lR, E, Rd and G in $ millions.
Source: R, E and A extracted from; The Eastern Central
MotGr Carriers Association, Inc., statement of Evidence in
Justification of General Increase. Rd and 5 calculated by
the author.
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'I'ABLEA.4
Grants Analysis of Common Carrier Rate Structures1
Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau (RMMTB)
1976 Da.ta: Pr-e j ected by RMM'l'B
From 1975 Through 31 March 1976 Operating Levels
SHIPMEN'l' REA D Rd G
1-499 lbs. 350.2 446.3 1.274 .93 479.9 129.7
500-999 lbs. 173.0 165.8 .958 .93 178.3 5,3
1000-1999 lbs. 182.4 166.2 .911 .93 178.7 - 3.7
2000-J+999 Lbs , 239.6 198.1 .827 .93 213.0 -26.6
5000-9999 lbs. 155.6 116.7 .750 .93 125.5 -30.1
>10.000 lbs. 483.4 440.1 .910 ~ 423.2 -10.g
TOTALS 1584.2 1533.2 .968 .93 1648.6 64.4
--r-R E Rd nd G l' n $' millions .., " a "
Source: R, E and A extracted from; Rocky Mountain
M~t(l')rrariff Bureau, Inc., Evidential Case Justifying
Increased Motor Carrier Rates and Charges in Rocky Mountain
Territories Scheduled Effective April 1. 1976. Rd and G
calculated by the author.
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TABLE A.S
Grmnts Analysis 0f Common Carrier Rate Structuresl
Middlewest Motor Freight Bure&u (MMFB)
19'16Data; Projected by MMFB
From 1975 Operating Levels
.§.:HIPMEN~ REA '-'D-' ---R-d----::::G-
Minimum Charge
500-999 Ibs.
1000-1.999 Ibs.
2000-4999 lbs.
5000-9999 Ibs.
>1.0~000 lbs.
54.4 71.2 1.J09 .93
62.1 79·5 1. 280 .93
62.1 64.2 1.034 .93
77.0 69.6 .904 .93
91..0 71.3 .784 .93
76.8 55.7 .725 .93
76.6 22.2
85.5 23.4
74.8 2.2
.824 .:-22 .LQ§~ =-lQ..J?
562.2 512.0 .911 .93 550.5 - 11.7
lR, E, Rd and G in $ millions.
Source: R, E and A extr~cted from; Middlewest Motor
Freight Bureau, Restructuring of Minimum Charges and L'rL
Class Ra1es Resulting in Net Reduction. Rd and G calculated
by the author.
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TABLE A,6
Grants Analysis of Common Carrier Rate Structures1
Southern Motor Carriers Rate CQnference (SMCRC)
1976 D~ta: Projected by SMCRC
From 1975 Through 14 February 1976 Operating Levels
-------- ~------'~--------~--------~~--~----~~SHIPIVlENT REA D H9.:_... . SL_
Minimum Charge 134.1 178.6 1.331 .93 192.0 57·9
1-499 lbs. 226.6 262.5 1.159 .93 282.) 55.7
500-999 Ibs. 182.5 185.6 1.017 .93 199.6 17.1
1000-1999 lbs. 195.3 187.5 .960 .93 201.6 6.3
2000-4999 lbs. 266.4 239.7 .900 .93 257.7 - 8.7
5000-9999 lbs. 159.1 140.2 .881 .93 150.8 - 8.3
>10,000 lbs. 84.7 70.1 .828 .93 75·4 - 9·3
Truckl(l)ad _..24.5.6528.8 1.012 ~ _5.68.6 23.0
1794.3 1793.0 .93 1928.0 133·7.999
1R, E, Rd and G in $ millions.
Sources R, E and A extracted from; Southern M0~or
Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., Increased Motor Carrler
B~tes and Charges From! To and Within the South. Rdand G
calculated by the author.
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gate common carrier financial operating data projected for
1976 by four motor carrier rate bureaus. These analyses were
conducted according to the mathematical model presented in
the preceeding section. l'hese samples cone ict of 300 common
carriers (2% of the regulated industry) which earned combined
1974 operating revenues of $5.4 billion (25% of the regulated
industry total) (1,1)(20)(23)(25)(28).
Table A.7 combines the data from tables A.3 through A.6
to present an aggregate financial operating picture of all
sampled rate bureau st.a'ti st.Lcs, 3ecause of the large sample
size and the broad distribution of firms in both size and geo-
graphical location, inferences about the industry will be
drawn from trends observed.
rI'able A.8 summarizes the results of analysis performed
in tables A. 3 through A.7. r1'hefollowing conclusions can be
crawn from the findings presented in table A. 8:
1) 11.80% ($639.9 million) of the regulated transport
bill of our sample firms is in the form of grant equivalents
which have been traced directly to the rate structures of reg-
ulated f Lrms . Applying this finding to the total 1974 indus-
try revenues results in; .118($22.4 billion) = $2.64 billion.
This amount was mis-applied in 1974 in the form of grant equiv-
alents contained in common carrier rate structures.
2) Most carriers operated at a level above the I.C.C.
suggested ratio (A = D = .93). For Our sample firms, all
carriers had a combined revenue deficiency of :j)289.9million.
Tlhe manner in which rates are set and rs.te adjustments
are proposed by the rate bureaus dbes not sufficiently take
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Grants Analysis of Common Carrier Rate structures1
ECMC A t lVITvIFB,RMM'I']3and SIVICRC Aggregate Data
1976 Projected Operating Levels
SHIPMENT R E A D R~_' _.Q_
Minimum Charge 296.1 392.0 1.324 .93 421.5 125.4
1,-499lbs. 821.2 992.1 1.208 .93 1066.8 245.6
500-999 lbs. 567.9 566.1 .997 .93 608.7 40.8
1000-1999 Ibs. 613.2 576.8 .941 .93 620.2 7.0
2000-4999 lbs. 811.6 702.2 .865 .93 755·1 -56.5
5000-9999 lbs. 532.6 436.1 .819 .93 468.9 -63.7
>10,000 lbs. 766.2 663.0 .865 .93 712.9 -53.3
rl'rucklcad 1022.1 __2_22.0 .!.21l ~ 1066.7 44.6
TOTALS 5430.9 5320.3 .980 .93 5720.8 289.9
lR, E, Rd and G in $ millions.
Sourcel Compiled by the author from tables A.J through
A.6.
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'l'ABLEA.8
Grants Analysis of Common Carrier Rate structures1
Grant Eouivalent Results
Rate Bureau Table Gc Gt Gr
ECMCA (67 Carriers) 4.4 103.4 140.2 9.40%
RMMrrB (49 Carriers) 4.5 64.4 205·6 12.97%
MMFB (97 Carriers) 4.6 -11.7 116.7 20.76%
SMCRC (87 Carriers) 4.7 13J.7 186.3 10.401£
rcr AL (.300 Carriers) 4.8 289·9 639.9 11. 80%
lGC and Gt in $ millions.
Note: Formulae used above are:
n n GtGc - I: G Gt ::::: g;1 Fgl Gr _. Rg=l g
Source: 'rables A.J. A.4, A·5" A.6 and A.7.
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into account the grant equivalents in the rate structure.
The I.C.C. desires that all carriers receive a fair ra.te-of-
return (to stabalize the industry) and that all shipments pay
their own way (to remove discrimination and preferential
treatment from the market). If these goals are to be realized,
these grants must be acknowledged, identified~ measured and
eliminated.
Rate structure Grants Reduction:
A Suggested Approach to Current Problems
Explicit in the preceeding analysis is a simple solution
to the grants elimina.tion problem; simply make the revenue
adjustments necessary for each shipment category to be charged
rates resulting in an operating ratio of .93. 'I'ab l,eA.9 pre-
sents the method of computing these adjustments. Column de-
scriptions are presented below the table. rrhemethod of com-
pleting the table follows:
1) Extract Rand E from data supplied by firms or rate
bureaus. The data in table A.9 are hypothetical, extracted
from table A.2.
2) Compute AI A :=: E .:. R..
3) D = .93 under current regulatory policy.
4) Compute (A-D): This is a simple sUbtraction of D
from A. It tells us how far the shipment category's operating
ratio deviates from D.
5) Compute M: M = £(A-D). Multiplying M by 100 yields
the percent chan[;e in revenue required to bring the category's
R in line with a .93 operating ratio. For example, for the
APPENDIX 116
'TABLE A.9
Grant Elimination Through Revenue Adjustment1
(Hypothetical Data)
SHIPTVlENT REA D (A-D) M
1-499 pounds
500 625 1.250 .93 .320 .3441
1000 1150 1.150 .93 .220 .2366
1000 1000 1.000 ·93 .070 .0753
1500 1425 ·950 .93 .020 .0215
1500 1250 .83J .93 -.097 -.1043
1000 800 .800 .93 -.130 -.1398
500 350 .700 .93 -.230 -.2473
3000 2700 .900 ~ -.OJO -.032,2
10000 9300 .930 .93 .000 .0000
Minimum Charge
500-999 pounds
1000-1999 pounds
2000-4999 pounds
5000-9999 pounds
>10,000 pounds
Truckload
'I10'I'ALS
E in $ milli0ns.
Column Descriptions:
SHIPMENT: Standard shipment weight categories.
R: Operating Revenue.
E: Operating Expense.
A: Actual Operating Ratio (A = E 7 R).
D: I.C .C. Desired Operating Ratio (D :: .93) .
(A-D) I l'he difference between the actual and
1.C.c. operating ratios.
00: Grant Elimination Multiplier. Example; in
the "Minimum Charge" row. .3441 means, "raise revenue 34.41%
from its current level to eliminate the grant equivalent."
WI ::: l/D(A-D).
Source, Data were constructed and data manipulations
performed by the author for illustrative purposes in comput-
ing percentage revenue adjustments required to eliminate
grant equivalents from a rate structure.
IR and
Note:
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"minimum charge" category, a 34.41r;,; revenue increase is re-
quired. For the "5000-9999 pounds" category, a 13.98~~revenue
reduction is required. These adjustments will change revenue
to a level equal to the desired revenue (Rd) calculated in
table A.2.
This method, although relatively simple, would be very
disruptive to the rate structure. A 34% rate increase would
undoubtedly alarm shippers. A more gradual reduction in grant
equivalents 8 applied during routine cost-push revenue increases,
can be accomplished by the method described below. Over time,
this system will result in an essentially grant-free rate struc-
ture.
The basic financial data presented in table A.6 were ex-
tracted from a rate increase proposal submitted to the I.C.C.
by the Southern Motor Carriers Hate Conference (SMCRC)(25).
The SMCRC submitted their proposal for rate hikes in response
to an expected wage increase which was estimated to add ~118.7
million to operating expenses (E). Their proposal was for an
overall revenue increase of 6% ($107.6 million), Without this
increase, the sr~;cpc firms' average operating ratio would have
risen to A == 1. 065. Gr would have risen from 10,1-1-% to 15.1?1o.
After distribution of the $107.6 million over all cate-
gories of shipments using the SNICRCproposal, Gr falls from
10.4% to 10.2%--a small grant equivalent reduction. Careful
allocation of the additional revenue using the grant minimiza-
tion method proposed below could have resulted in a greater
reduction of Gr, w it hou't the "shock effect" of the direct grant
elimination method presented in table A.9.
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l'able 11, 10 summari zes the percent rate changes which
would accompany each of three revenue allocation methods; the
simple grant elimination method of table A.9, the actual SMCRC
proposal, and the grant minimization method explained below in
tables A.l1 through A.13.
l'he first step in the grants minimization method is to
reconstruct current operating data, interjecting the projected
increases in operating expenses (E). Table A.l1 is essentially
a presentation of table A.6 with the new wage increase esti-
ma'ti.ons added to :2 (25, 1-4). Using column G of table A.li.
the SMCRC proposed gross revenue increase Ul:il07. 6) is distri-
buted among the various shipment categories as follows:
1) In table A.12, each new grant equivalent from column
G of table A.II is, in turn, divided by the new carrier grant
equivalent (Gc = $261.3 million).
2) This result is multiplied by the proposed revenue
increase (Rp = ~107.6 million).
3) This yields a proportionate revenue adjustment (Ra)
which is then added to R to yield the revenue level wh ich will
be realized under the grant minimization method (Ra + R).
Table A.13 shows the aggregate financial operating data
of SMCRC firms after (Ra + R) and the estimated wage increase
are inserted. Gt is now 159.1 rather than 194.1 with SMCRC's
method. Gr has been reduced to 8.4% rather than 10.2% with
SMCRC ~s method. 'I'heapplication of this process has resu'lted
in an 18~;& greater reduction in grants than the method employed
by the rate bureau, and has avoided the radical adjustments re-
quired by the complete grant ~limination method.
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TABLE A.10
Total Grant Elimination Rate Adjustment,
The SMCHC Proposed Rate Increases,
And A Grant-Minimizing Alternative
Weight r otaL Grant SMCRC Grant-Minimizing
Category EliminatiGn 1::.£.o£osa1 Alternative
Minimum. Charge +43. 125:& +10~~ +22.1%
1·-499 Ibs. +24.62% + 8% +13.8%
500-999 lbs. + 9.36% + 7% + 7.0%
1.000-1999 lbs. + .'3.23% ,.. 6% + 4.3%
2000-4999 Lb s , ~ 3.23% + yt + 1.4~~70
5000-9999 lbs. - 5.27% + 5% + o 5"/• /0
:>10,000 lbs. -10.97% + 5iJi; - 2.2%
TrucklGad + 8.82~ .+ !2~ + 4.J~
TOTALS + 8.82% + 6% + 6.0%
S~urce: Total Grant Eliminatien percentages computed
by the auther according to the method described in table
4.10. SMCRC rate prCllposalsextracted frcam; Southern Motor
Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., Increased Motor Carrier
Rates and Charged Fr~m, To and Within the South. Grant-
minimizing alternative percentag~s computed by the author
according to the method described in tables A.l1. A.12 and
A.lj.
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'rABLE A.11
Rate structure Grant Minimization Process
Southern Motor Carriers Rate C~nference 1
Step 1: Grant Measurement with Increased Expenses'
~IP~~Nl . ~R~ ~E~ ~AM ~R~d~ ~G~·_
Minimum Charge 134.1 191..7 1.430 206.1 72.0
1-499 pounds 226.6 281..4 1,242 302.6 76.0
500-999 pounds 182·5 198.7 1.089 21).7 .31. 2
1000-1999 pounds 195.3 200.5 1.027 215.6 20.)
2000-4999 pounds 266.4 255.9 275·2 8.8
5000-9999 paunds 159.1 .938 160.4 1.3
>10,000 pounds 84.7 74.4 .878 80.0 -4.7
Truckload 54,2.6 559·2 1.026 602.0 56.4
TOTALS 1794.3 1911.7 1.065 2055.6 261.3
lE was estimated by SMCRC from 1975 thrQugh 14 February
operating data. R, E, Rd and G in $ millions. .
Source: Table A.6 and; Southern Motor Carrlers Rate
C0nference~ Inc. e Increased M~tQr Carrier Rates and Charges
Frllm, To and Within the SC?uth. ..
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'l\ABLE A.12
Rate Structure Grant Minimization Process
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference
Step 2: Revenue Adjustment Computation
Gc R2 Ra _....:.f:..:_{ __ _....!.(.;::,;R.::::;:a+~l
72.0 .2755 + 134.1 ;:;:
'16.0 261. 3 :::: .2909 31.3 + 226.6 25'1·9
31. 2 261.3 ::: .1194 x 10'1.6 ;:;:1.2.8 + 182.5 = 195·3
20.3 261. 3 == .0777 x 107.6 = 8.4 + 195·,3 203·7
8,8 261. J ;:;: .0337 x 107.6 ::: 3.6 + 266.4 270.0
1..,3 261. J == .0050 x 107.6 "- 0.8 + 159.1 159.9
261.3 - -.0180 x 107.6 - -1.9 + 84.7 == 82.8
56, l~. 261..3;:;: .21.58
[ == 1. 0000
lGrant equivalent resulting from projected rise in E
without increasing revenue (R) (from Table A.il).
2Grant equivalent multiplier == the percent of the total
grant equivalent which is contained in each particular weight
category.Sources Formula de~eloped and computations made by the
author. Data were obtained from table A.lt and; southern
~otor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., Increased Motor Carrier
Rates and Charges From, To, and Withinthe8outh.
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Rate structure Grant Minimization Pr0cess
Southern Meter Carriers Rate Conference
3: Operating Levels After Process APplication1Step
(Ra+RL~ E A Rd G %I>R
Minimum Charge
1-499 Ibs.
500-999 lbs.
1.000-1999lbs.
2000-4999 lbs.
5000-9999 lbs.
>10,000 lbs.
rrruckload
TO'I'ALS
16).7 191.7 1.171 206.1
257.9 281.4 1.091 302.6
195.3 198.7 1.017 213.7
203.7 200·5 .984 215.6
270.0 255·9 .948 275.2
159.9 149.2 .934 160.4
82.8 74.4 .899 80.0
568.~ _...259.9 ~ 602.0
1901.9 1911.7 1.005 2055.6
42.4 +22.1
44.7 +13.8
18.4 + 7.0
11.9 -I-- 4.3
5.2 ... 1.4
0·5 + 0.5
-2.8 - 2.2
33.2 + 4.J
153.7 ...6.0
l(Ra+R), E Rd and G in $ millions.
Source: T~bles ~.11 and ~.12.
I
I
l
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Hate changes will continue to occur due to soaring costs
and increasing demand from an ever-growing economy. However,
to maximize the economic potential of t.heso revenue change re-
quirements, their implementation should be used to minimize
rate structure grant equivalents. This section describes only
one of a myriad of procedures which could be developed under
the current rate-making process to accomplish this much-needed
economic adjustment. Continued employment of this or a simi-
lar method in the future could result in the eventual elimi-
nation from the rate structure of the type of grants uncovered
in this section. If economic dislocations occur due to grant
elimination, that will be the time for the application of any
explicit grants deemed to be in the public interest.
Revenue Distribution and Grants Reduction
Under BRP
ItIn our discussion of the BRP model, the requirement was
laid upon firms to distribute among shipment categories, any
revenue changes imposed by the DRP revenue formula. rrhe data
required for accomplishment of this process was not available
for sample firms A and B. Operating ratios for particular
categories are required for firms if 'iveare to distribute such
revenues over shipment categories while attempting to reduce
rate structure grant equivalents. This section will describe,
using hypothetical data, the process which would be followed
by firms in their revenue distribution efforts under BHP.
In table A.14, we initially assume that our hypothetical
firm (firm C) has invested :.,j54100 in transportation (It ::::iIA100) J
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TABLE A,1Il-
Financial Statistics and Grant Equivalents
Hypothetical Firm C
SHIPMENT R E A G
Minimum Charge 500 625 1.250 1'12
1-499 peunds 1000 1150 1.150 237
500-999 pounds 1000 1000 1.000 '15
1000-1999 pounds 1500 1425 .950 32
2000-4999 pounds 1500 1250 .833 -156
5000-9999 pounds 1000 800 .800 -140
>10,000 pounds 500 350 .700 -123
Truckload 3000 2700 ~ =-22..
TOTALS 10000 9300 .930 0
SGlurce: 'l'ableA.2.
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and that table A.14 reflects its curr-ent financial operating
condition. The base-return will be kept at B = .23. Base-
return calculations for firm C reveal:
RB =: B(It) + E -- .23(4100) + 9300 =: 10243.
AF, :::: E .:. HB 9300 . 10243 .908.D - ::::. •
(RE - R) = 10243 - 10000 ::::243.
'//emust therefore add 243 to firm CiS total revenue in
order to reach the appropriate BRF operating ratio for this
firm; AB = .908. Table A.15 demonstrates the BRF method of
distributing this revenue increase over the relevant ship-
ment weight categories, while simultaneously allowing for
maximum grants reduction in each category. The method of
completing the table follows:
'I'heSHIPMENrr column of the table is completed with refer-
ence to column A of table A.14. Any shipment category having
an operating ratio (A) greater than .908 (our computed AB) is
included in the revenue distribution process. '1'hereason for
excluding the other shipments is that they are already paying
more than their "fair share" of the transport burden. rrhey
are effecting grants to the carrier and other shipment cate-
gories. It would be inappropriate, if we are attempting to
simultaneously reduce grant equivalents, to increase the size
of their grants by increasing the revenue requirements (rates)
for these shipment categories.
The (AB-A)E column reflects the proportionate size of the
difference between current and BRP operating ratios for each
category, controlled for the impact of each category's expense
level on the firm's operations. This column allowS the appro-
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priate weight to be assigned to each category prior to per-
formi.ng the revenue distribution calculations wh i.chfollow.
The grant equivalent multiplier (Gm) is obtained by
dividing each (AB-A)E result by'the sum of'all (AB-A)E pro-
ducts. Each category's Gm is then multiplied by the carrier
grant equivalent (Gc, the amount by wh ich we desire to raise
revenue) . 'l'h i s results in a revenue adjustment (Ra) for each
category, proportionate to its contribution to the total grant
equivalent of the firm. When Ra is added to current revenue
(R)~ it results in a grant-minimized BRP revenue (RB) for the
firm, for each category included in the process.
The resulting RB data from table A.iS are now transfer-
red to a grants analysis table to determine the percentage
by which ra.tes must be adjusted to reach the new BRP revenue
for each category. 'Table A.16 presents this process. 'l'he
method of completing the table follows:
The R column is extracted from table A.14. It reflects
the actual reVenue level at the time of application of the
BRP process. The RB column is completed from table A.14 for
those categories not included in the revenue distr'ibution pro-
cess (for these firms, R == HB), and table A.15 for those cat-
egories whos e revenues have been adjusted.
E is taken from table A.14; it is unchanged. COlTI-
A • RBputed for each category by the formula; "0 == E ': . It i.s
included to inform the analyst of each category's relative
deviation from the firm's desired operating ratio (.908) •
~_1heD,:) column is the desired operating ratio for the0
firm. Note that it is not equivalent to the D used earlier
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'I' ABLE A.16
Grants AnalysisOf Base-Return Revenue Distribution
(Hypothetical Firm C)
(Havenue Increase)
SHIPlVlENrr R R E AB DB Rd GB %5'RB _--
I'JlinimumCharge 500 581 625 1. 076 .908 688 107 16.20
1_1+99 Lbs , 1000 1105 1150 1.041 .908 1267 162 10·50
500-999 lbs. 1000 1035 1000 .966 .908 1101 66 3.50
1000-1999 Ibs. 1500 1522 1425 .936 .908 1569 47 1.47
2000-L1-999lbs. 1500 1500 1250 .833 .908 1377 -123 .00
5000-9999 lbs. 1000 1000 800 .800 .908 881 -119 .00
>10,000 lbs. 500 500 350 .700 .908 386 -114 .00
Truckload )000 JOOO 2700 .:..2Q.Q ~ 2974 - 26 .00
rorr ALS 10000 10243 9300 .908 .908 10243 0 2.43
Source: Tables A.14artd -A~l05.
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in the grants analysis of current problems. That D reflected
the I. C . C. estimate of an appr'opr'La+e operating ratio (.93)
for all firms. In this case, Ds := AB . = .908 for everyFlrm C
category.
Rd is the desired revenue level at which each category
would operate, given the desired operating ratio of .908. It
is computed by the formula; Rd =: ...L(E) := 1. 1013E.DC)
GB
,L)
is the grant equivalent remaining within the rate
structure of each category. It is computed by subtracting
the BRP revenue (RB) from the desired revenue (Rd).
Finally, the 101>R column indicates the rate ad justment
'')required for each category to realize !:\B revenues. It is COIn-
pputed; %~R := (~B - R) ~ R.
"Orr,n'I-S1" d th AB~ Dn d 1 f" oJ'l'he 'I' _ i'\._~ lne un te r e , 1:') and R co urnrrs o. tab ..e
A.16 confirms that the carrier is now operating at it[3 desired
operating ratio (.908), and is receiving its desired level of
revenue (;:;510,243). 'I'here is no carrier grant equivalent (Gc)
n
remaining. Gc --g~lGg := 107 + 162 -I:- 66 + 47 - 123 - 119 - 111.1-
- 26 := O. 'I'hefirm was seeking a 2.43% overall revenue in-
crease (from :1)10000 to ~i)10243). 'I'he total of the 5iPH column
also reflects success in this measure.
'I'he total grant equivalent is computed by summing the
absolute values of all category grant equivalents. For our
original data in table A.14; Gt = 172 + 237 + 75 + 32 + 156 +
140 + 123 + 97 = 1032. Our base-return adjusted total grant
equivalent is; GtE = 107 + 162 + 66 + 47 -+- 123 + 119 + 114 +
26 = 764.
'I'he grant ratio is computed by the formula; Gr ::::Gt : h.
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For our original data in table A,14, Gr c:: 1032 + 10000 ~.::.1032.
Our base-return adjusted grant ratio IS; Gr" = Gt~ ~ Rn = 764
Jj ::J' D
: 10243 =: .0'746.
The desired result from this revenue distribution process
was a reduction in both total grant equivalents and the grant
ratio of the rate str-uct.ur-e, T'he application of BEP tor-mu.l.ae
and revenue di.stribution t echruque s ha.sresulted in a 267~re-
duction in Gt and a 28% reduction in Gr.
p-
c'
\
Tables A.17 and A.18 present the identical process for
firm C with one exception. Investment in transportation is
now assumed to be much lower (It =: $2000). Our BRP formulae
in this case result in the requirement for a revenue redu~.-
tion. 'l'he specific data are;
RB = B(It) + E = .23(2000) + 9300 = ~9760.
AB = E f RB = 9300 : 9760 = .953.
:; 9760 10000 = -~)240.
We must distribute a ;j;240reduction among the shipment
categories. To maximize the grant reduction potential of the
system, we will reduce revenues only for those firms whose
operating ratios (in table A.14) are less than Ar-i•I) 'l'hosc with
A greater than A:s are already being subsidized by the categories
with A less than ~B'
J
The revenue distribution computations are contained in
table A.17. The TOTALS line in table A.18 under the AB, DB'
Rd and G columns confirms that the carrier is operating at its
desired operating ratio (.953) and that no grant equivalent
to or from the carrier exists after ERP application. The firm
was seeking an over 2.4% revenue decrease (~9760 - ~10000).
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'1'ABLE x. 18
Grants Analysis
Of Base-Return Revenue Distribution(Hypothetical Firm C)
(Revenue Decrease)
SHIPMENT R RB E AB DB Rd GB % R
Min Charge 500 500 625 1. 250 .953 657 157 .00
1-499 lbs. 1000 1000 1150 1. 150 .953 1207 207 .00
500-999 1000 1000 1000 1.000 .953 1049 49 .00
1000-1999 1500 1498 1425 .951 .953 1495 - 3 -0.1.3
2000-4999 1500 1429 1250 .875 .953 1312 -117 -4.73
5000-9999 1000 942 800 .849 .953 840 -102 -5.80
>10,000 500 458 350 .764 .953 367 - 91 -8.40
Truckload _3000 ~ ~1QQ ~ ~ £ill -100 -2.23
TOTALS 10000 9760 9300 .953 .953 9760 0 -2.40
Source: 'rabIes A . .14 .and ,-Ai 17.
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'l'he5~t»RcoLumn indicates that this has been realized.
I1hetotal grant equivalents compare cL~:; follows; Gt (from
table A.14) = 1032. Gtn = 157 + 207 + 49 + 3 + 117 + 102 +
D
91 + 100 = 826. The result is a 20% reduction in the total
grant equivalent of the firm's rate structure. Grant ratiO
calculations yield; Gr (from table A.14) = .1032. GrB = 826
f 9760 = .0846, an 18% reduction.
Notes
1. PP. 3J.~_lW , supra.
2. PP. 100-101, supra.
3. See table 4.1, p. 29, supra.
4, PP. 1+9-52, supra.
11.
1.2.
13·
14.
15·
16.
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